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Abstract: High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze 
HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of 
complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence 
and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of 
productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors 
with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The 
institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. 
We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of 
HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regula-
tion, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions bene-
ficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable 
environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. 
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Executive Summary 
Empirical evidence indicates that a small number of high-growth firms (HGFs), also known as 
“Gazelles”, are crucial for net job creation and economic growth. Arguably, it is likely that 
HGFs are more responsive to economic policy than firms with low or no growth ambitions. We 
analyze how the institutional framework affects such firms, taking the theory of competence 
blocs as our point of departure. According to this theory, firm growth is driven by the perpetual 
creation and application of knowledge. The central element in this process is the competence 
bloc, which associates key economic actors with the complementary competencies required to 
generate and commercialize novel ideas: inventors, entrepreneurs, industrialists, venture capi-
talists, actors in secondary markets, skilled workers and competent customers. Growth depends 
on the acquisition and utilization of knowledge by these different actors. The opportunities for 
doing this, and the incentives to seize such opportunities, are determined by the “rules of the 
game” – the institutions of a society. Our analysis is confined to advanced economies where 
fundamental institutions like a well-functioning legal system are already in place.  
We identify three institutional categories as key areas for the promotion of HGFs: the tax 
system, the organization of labor markets and product market regulations. We characterize spe-
cific institutions as either (1) fostering dynamic capitalism, by providing a favorable environ-
ment for the emergence of competence blocs and the generation of HGFs; or (2) leading to scle-
rotic capitalism, by failing to produce such an environment. 
Within these three institutional categories, government monopolization of production poses 
the greatest obstacle. Non-contestable public sector monopolies close entire markets to private 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Consequently, the competencies that these actors 
represent will be absent and there will be no competence blocs or HGFs under such a regulatory 
regime.  
High taxes and labor market regulations also impinge on the creation and functioning of 
competence blocs. However, there is often some scope for costly evasion of taxes and regula-
tions. It is still true that the industry distribution, as well as the size and age distributions of 
firms, will adjust endogenously, favoring the industry and firm structure least penalized by a 
certain regulatory setup. In practice, this is also likely to penalize HGFs. It is noteworthy that 
these institutions typically introduce distortions that are disadvantageous to young, small and 
service-sector firms – exactly the kind of firms that are overrepresented among HGFs. 
Analyzing HGFs through the lens of the theory of competence blocs offers a more holistic 
view of economic growth. In our view, rapid firm growth is a complex process requiring a 
number of complementary competencies, implying that studies with a narrow focus on a single 
aspect are likely to be misleading.  
Our analysis suggests that the commercialization of innovations and generation of HGFs 
would be greatly facilitated if more product markets are contestable and tax structures and labor 
market institutions are adjusted in order to stimulate the emergence of more effective compe-
tence blocs. Table of Contents 
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   1
At the microeconomic level, restructuring is characterized by countless 
decisions to create and destroy production arrangements. These deci-
sions are often complex, involving multiple parties as well as strategic 
and technological considerations. The efficiency of these decisions de-
pends not only on managerial talent but also on the existence of sound 
institutions that provide a proper transactional framework. 
Ricardo Caballero (2007, p. 3, italics added) 
 
1. Introduction  
Most productive activities take place in profit-driven enterprises. These organizations also 
carry out a major share of all research and development and function as the main vehicles for 
economic renewal – in short, they are the engine of long-run economic growth. The success 
of an individual enterprise hinges on its ability to combine diverse factors of production and 
to satisfy consumers in an efficient way. At the aggregate level, economic growth in contem-
porary market economies presupposes continuous and massive microeconomic restructuring 
and factor reallocation. 
Enterprises exhibit large heterogeneity in age, size, industry affiliation, growth ambitions 
and realized growth performance. It is well documented that young and small firms contribute 
disproportionately to net employment and productivity growth.
1 Meanwhile, most firms grow 
very slowly, or not at all. Zook and Allen (1999) report that only one in seven companies 
achieves sustained growth while remaining profitable. Accordingly, some observers point to a 
small number of rapidly growing firms – which may be neither small nor young – that contri-
bute a disproportionately large share of net job creation and economic growth (see, e.g., Birch 
and Medoff 1994, Storey 1994, Schreyer 2000, and Acs et al. 2008). To the extent that this is 
true, it is of crucial importance to understand under what institutional conditions talented en-
trepreneurs are motivated to establish firms with the ambition and ability to expand rapidly, as 
well as what conditions are conducive to the expansion of existing firms with growth poten-
tial.  
Our main aim in this paper is to characterize the institutional setup that is likely to be most 
conducive to the fostering of high-growth firms (HGFs).
2 By institutions we mean “the rules of 
the game in society” (North 1990, p. 3). 
                                                 
1 For a survey of the empirical evidence, see van Praag and Versloot (2008). 
2 Gerschenkron (1962) introduces the felicitous concept “appropriate institutions”, which nicely captures what 
we set out to identify in this essay. Gerschenkron’s term has recently received renewed attention, see, e.g., 
Acemoglu et al. (2003). They focus on differences in what constitutes good policy depending on a country’s 
“distance to the technological frontier”. More generally, the role of institutions has moved to the fore of main-
stream explanations for economic performance, especially over the longer term. See, for example, North and 
Weingast (1989), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2005).   2
It should be noted that there is a large literature studying the effect of so-called micro-
level factors on firm growth. In a wide-ranging survey of the literature on firm growth, Storey 
(1994) identified 35 such factors, which he classified into three categories (p. 122): i) The 
starting resources of the entrepreneur(s), e.g., motivation and education; ii) the firm, e.g., age 
and size; and iii) strategy, e.g., management training and market positioning.
3 A related strand 
of literature addresses the effects of micro-level factors on HGFs; see, e.g., Delmar and Da-
vidsson (1998), and Barringer et al. (2005) for surveys. Barringer et al. (2005) identify found-
er characteristics, firm attributes, business practices and human resource management as the 
four most influential categories of variables explaining rapid firm growth. 
Turning to macro-level factors, there is a literature studying the effects of public policy, 
like tax policy and financial assistance, aimed at stimulating the growth of small and medium-
sized firms (see, e.g., Storey 1994, 2006).
4 The literature on the effects of institutions on firm 
growth in a broader sense – the business climate – is still limited (examples include De-
mirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, Henrekson 2005, Klapper et al. 2006, and Powell 2008). 
The literature specifically addressing the effects of institutions on HGFs is scarce, focusing 
almost exclusively on the provision of capital to high-growth firms; see e.g., Buss (2001).
5 
Two exceptions are Davidsson and Henrekson (2002), who analyze the effects of institutions 
on the incentives for entrepreneurs to establish and rapidly expand enterprises, and Stam et al. 
(2007) who discuss the policy implications of the fact that entrepreneurs with high growth 
ambitions contribute relatively more to economic growth than the average entrepreneur.  
Over the past decades endogenous growth theory has also developed models that come 
closer to making explicit what drives long-term economic development. Explicit incentives 
for innovation have been included so as to explain why individuals would engage in creating 
new technologies and better ways of producing goods and services (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995, and Aghion and Howitt 1998). However, the actual agents of change, the entrepreneurs, 
are still defined rather narrowly and theory does not capture the wide-ranging and complex 
functions suggested outside mainstream economics (see, e.g., Baumol 1968, Glancey and 
McQuaid 2000, Swedberg 2000, Johansson 2004, Bianchi and Henrekson 2005, and Phelps 
2007). To a great extent enterprises are still modeled as “representative firms” which are 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Delmar (1997), Davidsson (2006) and Reynolds (2007) for recent surveys and discussions.  
4 There is a larger literature on the institutional effects on firm entry and firm exit; see, e.g., Djankov et al. 
(2002), Fan and White (2003) and Brandt (2004).  
5 We do not count studies with general conclusions such as ”since HGFs are important, growth obstacles need to 
be removed.” The analysis needs to be more precise to be considered.    3
treated as “black boxes” (Rosenberg 1982, 1994) even though research scholars have started 
to open it up; see, e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Acemoglu et al. (2007).  
We argue that these approaches need to be supplemented by a micro-oriented analysis of 
how institutions affect the behavior of the individual actors involved in the process. In order 
to make such an analysis manageable, the actors are divided into a limited number of func-
tionally defined categories. The theory of competence blocs (Eliasson and Eliasson 1996) 
offers such a categorization. A competence bloc contains a set of actors with the different and 
complementary competencies required to generate and exploit new knowledge. This process, 
in turn, eventually results in large-scale economic development and economic growth. This 
requires ”breadth” (all categories of actors of the competence bloc have to be in place) as well 
as ”depth” (a critical mass of actors are needed to fulfill each function efficiently). Hence, this 
analysis may be seen as an extension of Davidsson and Henrekson (2002) where we expand 
the analysis to include other actors than entrepreneurs.
6 Our broader approach aims to deepen 
our understanding of the effects of institutions on HGFs, since institutions may affect differ-
ent actors differently. Due to the complementarity of competencies, institutions may have a 
larger effect on firm growth than suggested by an analysis that focuses on a single actor.  
An underlying assumption is that rapid economic growth and employment creation are ob-
tained if individual actors form competitive competence blocs and establish new firms with 
high growth potential and aspirations. This requires appropriate institutions that harmonize 
the incentives of the different types of actors with complementary competencies (Pelikan 
1993; Henrekson and Johansson 1999).  
The study is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the competence bloc and its key 
actors and competencies. In section 3 we briefly review the literature on HGFs. In section 4 
we discuss more generally the HGFs-institutions nexus, as a preamble to the in-depth institu-
tional analyses that follow. Section 5 deals with the effects of taxation, and section 6 discusses 
the organization of the labor market. Section 7 deals with product market regulations that dis-
turb the link between the entrepreneur and the customer, by restricting market entry by private 
entrepreneurs and by restricting private customers’ ability to choose a (private) provider. We 
classify institutions into either of two categories, depending on whether they support what we 
call “sclerotic” or “dynamic” capitalism, respectively. Section 8 concludes. 
                                                 
6 The surveys by, for instance, Storey (1994) and Barringer et al. (2005) show that studies investigating micro-
level factors mainly focus on the entrepreneur/founder (including discussions of his/her management team and 
his/her social and professional networks) and strategies for human resource management of employees, notably 
workforce training and incentive programs. The financial resources and provision of capital to growing firms are 
also discussed.    4
 
2. Competence Blocs and Growth 
Economic growth is a complex process of generation and use of knowledge (see, e.g., Hayek 
1945, 1978, Romer 1986, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Aghion and Howitt 1998, and Phelps 
2007). We draw on the theory of competence blocs (Eliasson and Eliasson 1996) to identify 
key actors with different but complementary competencies
7 that interact to generate, identify, 
select, expand and exploit new ideas about how to satisfy consumer preferences more effi-
ciently.
8 This theory identifies at least seven types of actors crucial to the generation of long-
run economic growth:  
i)  Entrepreneurs identify new ideas and introduce those with expected profitability into 
the market. They may be characterized as agents of change and fulfill a fundamental 
coordinating and judgmental function. 
ii)  Inventors solve specific technical, organizational or economic problems. Inventors 
have detailed knowledge about production processes, product specifications etc. that 
entrepreneurs may lack. Their work provides a basis for subsequent activity by entre-
preneurs who have a common understanding of the business idea and commercializa-
tion process. 
iii)  Industrialists organize the further commercialization of the original ideas into a large-
scale business after the introductory entrepreneurial phase.
9 The introduction of new 
ideas into the economy and the subsequent development of the original innovations in-
to large-scale businesses generally require two separate competencies (Flamholtz 
1986; Baumol 2004). Sometimes the original entrepreneur evolves into an industrialist 
and continues to head his/her firm as it becomes large, but more often than not, the en-
trepreneur will cede the top executive position to somebody with the requisite expe-
rience and competence to manage a large firm. The industrialist may also be a compet-
itor to the entrepreneur who introduced the original innovation. 
                                                 
7 Competence is defined as the ability to use knowledge to accomplish a particular purpose (Johansson 2001, p. 
16).  
8 See Johansson (2008) for an introduction. The idea of the importance of complementary competencies to gen-
erate growth is recognized by a number of research scholars. See, for instance, Phelps (2007, p. 553) for a dis-
cussion in conformity with our analysis.   
9 In relation to Schumpeter (1934) the industrialist conducts a similar function as the imitator. This does not 
simply mean copying the original innovation but includes incremental improvements and adjustments of the 
original innovation to new markets that in the long run may have a larger impact than the original innovation. 
See, e.g., Nelson and Winter (1982), and Baumol (2002).    5
iv)  Skilled labor. Economic development and economic growth requires labor with rele-
vant professional skills. Rapidly expanding industries are often hampered by lack of 
individuals with specific skills.  
v)  Venture capitalists supply equity capital to enterprises in early phases of business ven-
tures.
10 This includes identifying entrepreneurs and projects, assessing the value of po-
tential investments, supervising management and evaluating investments. In case of 
sustained mismanagement of a company, or if a company can be more skillfully ma-
naged by somebody else, venture capitalists can enforce change and appoint new man-
agement better equipped to lead the company. Venture capitalists can be said to pro-
vide “competent capital”, since they, in addition to providing capital, supply manage-
ment skills, industry-specific knowledge and access to business networks. The func-
tion is often performed by individuals with long experience of the industry in which 
they invest. Many are former entrepreneurs who have sold their businesses to invest 
the profits in new firms without assuming day-to-day operational responsibility.
11  
vi)  Actors in secondary (exit) markets have similar competencies and carry out similar 
functions as venture capitalists, but at a later stage when entrepreneurs and venture ca-
pitalists want to exit from their investments. There are several types of actors in sec-
ondary markets, most notably portfolio investors in publicly listed companies, private 
equity (PE) firms, and management buy-ins.
12 
vii)  Competent customers provide the entrepreneur with information about consumers’ 
preferences. The ability to discern the preferences of the consumers, so that highly-
valued goods and services are produced, is a key ingredient in successful entrepre-
neurship. A competent customer should be representative of large groups of custom-
ers. A competent customer can be an individual or a firm. Cooperation with one or 
several large firms dominating an industry provides knowledge about a considerable 
share of the market. Large enterprises rich in capital can also function as competent 
venture capitalists and finance the development of particular products.
13  
                                                 
10 So-called business angels carry out a similar function as venture capitalists, generally in earlier phases. Busi-
ness angels are not explicitly mentioned in the original definition of the competence bloc.  
11 Gompers and Lerner (2001) provide a comprehensive analysis of the importance of venture capital for innova-
tion and firm growth. 
12 See Wright (2007) for an overview of the different categories and Prowse (1998) for an analysis of the func-
tion of the private equity market. 
13 Perhaps the best example is the biotechnology industry where scientific breakthroughs, increased regulations, 
innovative “sclerosis” among large firms, high costs for development and commercialization of new products, 
and financial constraints in new and small firms have induced a massive formation of strategic alliances among 
firms. An important case in point is large firms financing small firms developing new products which are then 
commercialized by large firms. See, e.g., Lerner and Merges (1998), and Audretsch and Feldman (2003). Also   6
 
The different categories of actors are heterogeneous in a number of respects. For example, the 
competence of an industrialist may be restricted to a particular industry or to firms of a certain 
size.
14 One individual can carry out more than one function such as acting both as an entre-
preneur and as an industrialist.  
We distinguish between an invention, defined as a new idea, and an innovation, defined as 
the introduction of the invention into the economy. Technical innovations are often empha-
sized as particularly important for economic growth. As a consequence, policy often aims at 
stimulating technical innovations. This is likely to be insufficient from the perspective of eco-
nomic growth. Technological development is a result of human creativity and thus a result of 
the ways in which individuals organize in enterprises and communities. Organizational inno-
vations may dominate technological innovations and in those cases they become a prerequi-
site for the latter. 
Naturally, there is a form of interplay here – technological innovations and scientific 
breakthroughs with commercial potential make it necessary for the institutions of society to be 
flexible so they can adapt or be adapted to new circumstances. A forceful illustration of this 
point is that although China was considerably more technically advanced than Europe 1,000 
years ago, the West not only caught up, it also took the lead. The crucial institutional factor 
behind this reversal of technological and economic leadership was the (gradual and by no 
means complete) introduction of private property rights in Western Europe (North and Tho-
mas 1973, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Mokyr 1990, and Jones 2001). The introduction of 
private property rights was thus an organizational innovation of extraordinary material signi-
ficance. 
For several reasons it is impossible to know the value of an innovation ex ante. First, the 
number of potential innovations is infinite. Second, every actor, or group of actors, in the 
competence bloc is boundedly rational (Simon 1955, and Conlisk 1996, 2001). Third, infor-
mation is highly decentralized, in particular in early stages of development of a new technolo-
                                                                                                                                                         
see von Hippel (2007) for a study of how innovation users form networks to develop and diffuse innovations 
themselves.  
14 The original definition included the category “innovators”, whose function was an extension to that of inven-
tors. They bridged the gap between inventors and entrepreneurs. In practice, this implies a more administrative 
role, managing the integration of inventions and technologies into well-functioning worthwhile products. The 
definition differs from Schumpeter (1934) who uses ”innovator” and ”entrepreneur” synonymously. We have 
noticed that this confuses many readers and have therefore decided to leave out “innovators” from the analysis. 
Their function will be partially subsumed under the categories skilled labor and entrepreneurs.   7
gy or industry (Acemoglu et al. 2007).
15 Rather, every innovation should be regarded as a 
business experiment that may be tested in the market.  
The ex post performance of innovations that are tested in the market – by actors in compe-
tence blocs who establish firms to exploit innovations – show large variations in economic 
performance. There are good reasons to expect this state of affairs: The economic potential 
differs across innovations, firms and innovations are in different phases of development, and 
competence blocs themselves are in different phases of development. Consequently, an expe-
rimentally organized economy necessitates large flows of workers and other factors of pro-
duction across firms due to experimentation in the face of uncertain market prospects, cost 
structures, managerial abilities and technologies (Jovanovic 1982).
16 
 
3. The Role of High-growth Firms 
David Birch launched the term “Gazelles” about a quarter of a century ago referring to a small 
group of HGFs that, in his view, generated the bulk of new net jobs in the economy 
(Landström 2005, p. 170).
17 These HGFs were contrasted with the vast majority of firms that 
start out small and grow very little, therefore contributing marginally to employment growth, 
and to large companies with a large employment share but slow, or even negative, employ-
ment growth. These two types of firms were aptly denoted “Mice” and “Elephants”, respec-
tively. 
There is surprisingly little empirical evidence backing Birch’s claim. In Henrekson and 
Johansson (2008), we identify a grand total of 20 studies published after 1990.
18 The studies 
are disparate in scope and method; they use different metrics for growth, investigate firms in 
different industries, of different ages, in different time periods and cover different countries 
                                                 
15 For instance, Conlisk (1996, p. 691) writes: ”Many technological innovations result from insights that would 
have been made years earlier if people really could draw all possible inferences from existing information. In 
this sense, the rate of technical change is determined largely by bounds on rationality and by the resulting delays 
in exploiting economic opportunities.” 
16 80 percent or more of the reallocation of workers takes place within narrowly defined sectors of the economy 
in developed countries. See Caballero (2007, p. 19 ff) for an overview of the evidence. 
17 Fast growing firms have also been named “flyers”, e.g., by Storey (1994), who also discerns “trundlers” (slow 
growth firms) and “failures” (exiting firms).  
18 Birch and Medoff (1994); Kirchhoff (1994); Storey (1994); Birch et al. (1995); Picot and Dupuy (1998); Autio 
et al. (2000); Schreyer (2000); Brüderl and Preisendörfer (2000), Davidsson and Delmar (2003, 2006); Delmar et 
al. 2003; Littunen and Tohmo (2003); Fritsch and Weyh (2006); Halabisky et al. (2006); Acs and Mueller 
(2008); Acs et al. (2008) and Deschryvere (2008). Storey (1994) reports findings from 14 early studies investi-
gating the employment contribution of rapidly growing firms. Henrekson and Johansson (2008) count them as 
one study. Schreyer (2000) presents seven studies on high-growth firms and employment, which we treat sepa-
rately.  One of the studies in Schreyer (2000) concerns Sweden. As that study, Davidsson and Delmar (2003, 
2006), and Delmar et al. (2003) are based on the same Swedish data set and since they draw similar conclusions, 
we treat them as one study. In total our survey therefore encompasses 20 studies.   8
and regions. Two alternative definitions of HGFs are used.
19 The lack of suitable data, the 
cost of carrying out such studies, and the relatively recent interest in these questions may ex-
plain the dearth of research on this topic.  
Job contribution can be measured in terms of gross or net jobs (see, e.g., Davis and Halti-
wanger 1999 for a discussion). All the aforementioned studies report net job creation. The job 
contribution of HGFs is compared to the job contribution of non-HGFs in the investigated 
population or related to total employment growth, total unemployment or other aggregates. 
Moreover, firms can grow organically (i.e., through new appointments) or through acquired 
growth (i.e., growth through acquisitions and/or mergers), where organic growth is supposed 
to have a larger effect on net employment. However, with few exceptions lack of appropriate 
data make it difficult or impossible to separate the two. Some studies, therefore, focus exclu-
sively on single establishment firms, since there is reason to believe that they mostly grow 
organically.  
All of the studies are concerned with what Fritsch and Mueller (2004) denote “direct ef-
fects”, when analyzing the employment effect from new entry. They argue that employment 
initially increases due to the direct effect on employment from entering firms, but after some 
time begins to decline as firms with inferior productivity exit. In the long run, employment is 
increased due to positive supply-side effects. See Fritsch (2008) for a summary of the empiri-
cal evidence and a discussion.  
Despite the heterogeneity across the studies in several dimensions, some general findings 
emerge:  
i)  All studies report HGFs to be crucial for net job growth compared to non-HGFs. 
They generate a large share of all, or more than all (in the case where employment 
shrinks in non-HGFs), new net jobs. This is particularly pronounced in recessions 
when HGFs continue to grow, while non-HGFs decline or exit. 
ii)  Several studies, particularly the ones concerning the U.S., find that HGFs provide 
a large share of new net jobs relative to total job growth in the economy and total 
unemployment.  
iii)  Small firms are overrepresented among HGFs, but HGFs are of all sizes. In partic-
ular, larger firms are important job contributors in absolute terms. A small sub-
group of large HGFs – so-called Superstars or Super Gazelles – are major job crea-
tors.  
                                                 
19 First, firms whose growth exceeds a particular (annual) rate in a certain time period. Alternatively, a certain 
fraction of the firms in a population of firms, e.g., the 10 percent fastest growing firms. Recently, OECD (Ah-
mad 2006) proposed high-growth firms to be defined as “enterprises with an average employment growth rate 
exceeding 20 percent p.a. over a three-year period and with 10 or more employees at the beginning of the pe-
riod.” The term “Gazelles” was proposed to refer to HGFs less than five years old. In this essay we do not apply 
the proposed definition but use the terms “Gazelles” and “HGFs” synonymously.    9
iv)  Age is undisputedly of great importance. All studies reporting firm age conclude 
HGFs to be younger on average. Super Gazelles are also relatively young. HGFs 
are overrepresented in young and growing industries with a large inflow of new 
firms.  
v)  Young and small HGFs grow organically to a larger extent than large and old 
HGFs, and therefore make a larger contribution to net employment growth. 
vi)  HGFs are present in all industries. There is no evidence that they are overrepre-
sented in high-tech industries. If anything, HGFs appear to be overrepresented in 
service industries.  
 
On the basis of this meta-analysis, we conclude that HGFs are instrumental to economic 
growth, in particular those HGFs that start growing rapidly when young and small.
20 Recent 
evidence supports this conclusion. High growth potential Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
(TEA), measured according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) study, is the sole 
form of entrepreneurship that has any explanatory effect on differing rates of economic 
growth across nations (Wong et al. 2005).
21 The other three forms of entrepreneurship – over-
all TEA, necessity TEA and opportunity TEA – are found to have insignificant effects.
22 
Based on this and similar studies, Sternberg and Wennekers (2005, p. 200) conclude: “These 
findings may have important implications for entrepreneurship policy in highly developed 
economies. At least from an economic growth perspective, policy should focus primarily on 
potentially fast growing new firms and not on new enterprises in general.”  
A similar conclusion is made by Bartelsman et al. (2005, pp. 387–388) when finding post-
entry growth of successful entrants to be much higher in the USA than in Europe. They sug-
gest that this may indicate barriers to growth in Europe rather than barriers to entry: “The 
main difference between the USA and most European countries lays in post-entry employ-
ment growth amongst surviving firms. … U.S. firms experience a major increase in employ-
ment during the initial years, while employment growth amongst surviving firms in Europe is 
much more modest. These observed differences in post-entry growth … seem to indicate a 
greater degree of experimentation amongst entering firms in the USA.” Interestingly, the U.S. 
                                                 
20 One indicator of the propensity for new and small firms to grow into large firms is the rate at which the stock 
of large firms in the economy turns over. Here it is clear that the annual turnover rate on the Fortune 500 in the 
U.S. has accelerated in recent decades. While it used to take 15–20 years for a third of the Fortune 500 firms to 
be replaced, it has only taken about a third of that time in recent years (Baumol et al. 2007). Moreover, Yim 
(2006) reports that among the 358 firms that entered the Fortune 500 Index during the ten-year period beginning 
in 1993, 44 were founded after 1975. 
21 See Stam et al. (2007) for a similar result.  
22 Overall TEA measures the overall involvement in entrepreneurial activity defined as the sum of nascent entre-
preneurs (people in the process of starting a new business) and entrepreneurs that have recently started a busi-
ness. Necessity TEA refers to individuals pushed into entrepreneurial activities due to lack of other employment 
opportunities, and opportunity TEA refers to individuals pulled into entrepreneurship because of perceived busi-
ness opportunities (Bosma et al. 2008).    10
reports the largest share of entrepreneurs with high growth ambitions among rich countries 
according to the GEM study, while countries like Greece and Italy report the lowest (Bosma 
et al. 2008). 
The empirical findings that HGFs on average are both younger than other firms and over-
represented in new and rapidly growing industries is interesting when combined with the re-
search which finds that young firms seem to be more prone to explore new fields of know-
ledge with radically new innovations with a great economic potential, while large and mature 
firms dominate established areas (see, e.g., Almeida 1999). There is also evidence that old and 
large firms dominate process innovations, while young and small firms play a greater role in 
product innovations – an important distinction, as product innovations appear to be more im-
portant for long-run growth (see, e.g., Acs et al. 1999, and Acs and Audretsch 2005). Au-
dretsch (2006) summarizes the literature on innovations in small (often young) versus large 
(mostly old) firms and find small firms to be more innovative in some industries, particularly 
in new and dynamic industries. A number of explanations to this pattern have been suggested. 
For instance, Hannan and Friedman (1984) conclude that young and small firms are more 
flexible, since organizational inertia increases with age and size.
23 
The size distribution of firms (i.e., the relation between the number of small-sized and the 
number of large-sized firms), as well as the density of firms (i.e., the number of firms) in dif-
ferent size classes have consequences for the functioning of competence blocs and the preva-
lence of HGFs. First, the possibility of reaching a critical mass in the competence bloc in-
creases with the number of actors. With many firms there are more individuals with the requi-
site competence to organise productive activities and to run firms, which in turn implies a 
broader and more varied competence base from which business ideas can be generated and 
exploited. This is important for the efficient matching of new technologies with competent 
actors who recognize and exploit the potential profits of new ideas. The density of firms in 
different size classes is probably important because firms of different sizes might require dif-
ferent managerial competence. For instance, managers from large traditional manufacturing 
firms may have difficulties managing new, small biotech firms due to differences in corporate 
culture. Second, there is arguably a positive relationship between the number of actors and the 
number of experiments carried out, since each actor or group of actors can perform a limited 
number of experiments.  
                                                 
23 Holmström (1989) provides an excellent review and explication of the incentive and governance mechanisms 
that give small firms a comparative advantage in innovative activities.    11
While studies show that organic growth has a larger effect on net employment than ac-
quired growth, it would be wrong to infer from this fact that organic growth should be pro-
moted and acquired growth avoided. The latter is important for reallocating employment and 
other resources to more productive uses. Hence, HGFs growing externally may be of crucial 
importance for productivity growth, and may in turn spur new entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Holcombe 2003). Klepper and Simons (2005), for instance, show that growing industries 
typically experience shakeouts in which the number of firms after some time falls sharply due 
to exits, mergers and acquisitions. This gives rise to a pattern in the course of the evolution of 
an industry: Initially, the number of firms is very large, but as the industry grows and matures 
the selection process rapidly reduces the number of firms. It therefore seems normal that 
HGFs in mature industries grow through acquisitions of less efficient competitors.
24 
Figure 1 schematically summarizes the competence bloc and the role of the various actors 
in the process of fostering HGFs. The figure provides a stylized representation of the catego-
ries of actors in the competence bloc and of the growth phases of HGFs (the development of a 
business idea, introduction, early growth, rapid growth into a large-scale firm). Some catego-
ries may be important in several phases and a certain individual can fulfill several functions 
either simultaneously or at different points in the individual’s or firm’s life cycle. In a stylized 
form, the development of rapidly growing firms may be depicted as an S-curve. Most HGFs 
do not display sustained growth, but follow a more complex pattern; see, e.g., Parker et al. 
(2005). The figure shows at which stage of a firm’s growth different categories play a key 
role. The order in which the categories appear beneath the boxes indicates which actor that 
has the main coordinating responsibility. This is not a definite ranking and in practice it dif-
fers across enterprises, but a stylized depiction of what we believe is the typical situation. In 
the first phase, entrepreneurs together with competent customers identify potential business 
opportunities. Inventors are engaged to solve specific problems. The first phase of commer-
cialization (introduction and early growth of firms) involves entrepreneurs, while skilled 
workers are involved to a small extent only. Industrialists are active in the phase of industria-
lization and rapid growth, which also requires a great deal of skilled labor. Venture capitalists 
are important financiers in the earlier phases. In later phases when the firm is larger, this role 
is taken over by actors in secondary markets. Competent customers are typically involved in 
all phases and ultimately (together with other customers) determine the demand for the good. 
                                                 
24 Klepper (2002) provides many interesting examples in this regard. The U.S. automobile industry consisted of 
271 firms in 1909. This number was down by 60 percent by 1923, and by the 1960s only four car manufacturers 
remained in business. The television industry shows a similar pattern.   12
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The analysis suggests that it is useful to discern two kinds of incentives. The first kind directly 
affects the individuals carrying out a specific function in the competence bloc. Examples in-
clude taxes on wages and taxes on capital income. The second kind indirectly affects the ac-
tors via firm attributes like firm age, firm size and industry affiliation. Examples include insti-
tutional effects on the provision of capital in early or late phases of commercialization (firm 
age), labor security mandates (which tend to fall more heavily on small firms), and industry-
specific regulations. 
There are also spatial dimensions to the theory of competence blocs, such as the well-
recognized effects that some industries cluster around certain sources of raw materials (forest, 
mining etc.). The stages of the product life cycle mapped in figure 1 may also be geographi-
cally separated because different areas may be more conducive to different kinds of know-
ledge discovery and knowledge exploitation. For example, cities favorable for diversified 
knowledge are more suited in the early phases of the product cycle when generation of ideas 
is crucial, while cities advantageous for specialized knowledge are more suited for later (pro-
duction) stages (Duranton and Puga 2001). This implies that local institutional conditions may 
affect the workings of competence blocs and their ability to generate HGFs. For practical rea-
sons, we confine our analysis to the national level.
25  
 
4. Institutions and High-growth Firms 
The theory of competence blocs does not explicitly address whether certain types of firms are 
of particular importance. However, based on the evidence presented in section 3 we deem that 
HGFs should hold center stage. We are not implying that other types of firms are unimportant 
or that they can be ignored, but merely emphasizing the importance of letting firms with par-
ticularly large growth potential realize their full potential. This requires a level institutional 
playing field and involves a large number of actors and key competencies.  
Empirical evidence suggests that a high turnover (entry plus exit) of firms in itself boosts 
the number of HGFs (cf., Bartelsman et al. 2004, 2005, Brown et al. 2006, Birch 2006, Fogel 
et al. 2006, and Caballero 2007). A plausible explanation is that a high turnover of rims is a 
natural effect of an accelerated discovery procedure of new business opportunities and a rapid 
                                                 
25 See, for instance, Stam (2007) for an elaboration on the spatial dimension of HGFs.   13
reallocation of resources from unsuccessful to successful firms (see, e.g., Johansson 2005). A 
prerequisite for this process to generate HGFs is that entry and expansion as well as contrac-
tion and exit are facilitated, so that new and expanding firms can attract resources from ineffi-
cient firms. Without this dynamic reallocation the growth of firms will be hampered, irrespec-
tive of their inherent growth potential. 
In section 3 we noted that HGFs seem to do better in some countries than others. Such 
cross-country differences may not only derive from differences in industry structure and fac-
tor endowments. The alignment of the incentives of all actors in the competence bloc requires 
appropriate institutions that shape “the social structure of payoffs” (Baumol 1990). 
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to formal rules. Informal rules such as norms, val-
ues or codes of conduct are harder both to enact and to analyze, but also constitute important 
determinants of the business climate. We believe that both informal institutions and cultural 
attitudes are affected by formal institutions and policies. To the extent that norms and atti-
tudes are culturally codified products of the reward structures in society, institutional changes 
are likely to affect norms and attitudes as well (Bowles 1998; Baumol et al. 2007, pp. 203ff; 
Smith 2003).  
Modern societies are rich webs of formal and informal institutions that differ greatly in 
terms of their significance for the fostering of HGFs. To provide an exhaustive characteriza-
tion of the pertinent institutional setup conducive to rapid firm growth is beyond the scope of 
this study. Our aim is to describe mechanisms with a documented importance for firm growth, 
and show what kinds of institutions are required for these mechanisms to work efficiently. 
Many of our examples will involve Sweden, since that is the country we are most familiar 
with. 
Private property rights – including the existence of legal titles to hold property, and the 
protection thereof – is arguably the most fundamental economic institution (e.g., Libecap 
1993, Baumol 2002, and Rodrik et al. 2004). Secure property rights ensure that physical ob-
jects can be turned into capital, a transformation that requires judgment, imagination and in-
novation (de Soto 2000).
26 
                                                 
26 A system of secure private property rights presupposes that the rule of law prevails. The rule of law ensures 
the protection of individual freedom and social peace, but is also a very broad concept. See, e.g., Kasper and 
Streit (1998, pp. 165–168) for a definition and discussion of the rule of law.   14
When the protection of property rights is eroded, a first effect is to reduce the profits per-
taining to productive entrepreneurship.
27 For instance, business owners will retain a smaller 
share of profits in their firms (Johnson et al. 2002). A further effect is that entrepreneurship 
takes new forms, since opportunities to earn profits from unproductive entrepreneurship arise. 
This involves protective activities such as security firms and the like, which substitute for 
weak institutions. Moreover, profits can be earned by legally transferring land titles or other 
resources among groups of the population. If the protection of property rights continues to 
weaken, purely predatory forms of entrepreneurship, such as extortion and corruption, will 
gain currency. 
Well-functioning financial markets are also of crucial importance for economic develop-
ment, and by implication for firms with a high growth potential (Levine 2005). Following a 
series of reforms in the 1970s and 1980s financial markets (for debt, equity and foreign ex-
change) became considerably less regulated in most advanced economies. This process was 
completed by the early 1990s in virtually all of the wealthiest OECD countries.  
Our analysis pertains to high-income countries, where the rule of law applies, private 
property rights are reasonably secure, and financial markets are deregulated. Therefore, we 
will not deal further with these factors. The subsequent analysis will make clear that, for in-
stance, although financial markets are fully deregulated, other institutions, such as the tax 
system or rules governing pension savings schemes, may influence how well financial mar-
kets can cater to the needs of HGFs. A general conclusion is that multiple institutions tend to 
interact in complex ways, either reinforcing or reducing the total effect.  
In what follows we will in turn deal with the effect on potential HGFs of the tax system, 
institutions governing the labor market (including the regulation of labor markets, wage-
setting institutions and the social insurance system), and regulations barring product markets 
from private entrepreneurs and prohibiting private customers from buying preferred products 
and qualities from preferred suppliers.  
 
5. The Tax Code 
By referring to the theory of competence blocs we have identified seven distinct categories of 
actors crucial for HGFs. However, the tax code does not acknowledge these categories; there 
is no specific tax on income from entrepreneurial effort, inventive activity or the return on 
                                                 
27 Productive entrepreneurship means that the return on entrepreneurship comes from wealth generation. This 
stands in contrast to unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship where the return emanates from wealth redi-
stribution (Baumol 1990).   15
acquired skills. Instead, based on provisions in the tax code, individual income will be classi-
fied as labor income, capital income and/or corporate income, and within each of these cate-
gories there may be further provisions influencing the effective tax rate. Since tax income as a 
share of GDP varies between roughly 32 and almost 60 percent of GDP among OECD coun-
tries,
28 the incentive effects of the tax system are potentially large. These effects are also high-
ly complex and difficult to assess with precision.  
In Table 1 we outline the different kinds of taxation and list the most important aspects of 
each category.
29 In what follows we will discuss each type of tax in turn to examine how the 
incentives for the different categories of actors in the competence bloc are affected.  
 
5.1 Labor Taxation 
The level and progressivity of labor taxation (including mandatory social security contribu-
tions) always affect employees directly, by determining the incentives for work effort, labor 
supply (on the extensive and intensive margin), occupational choice, career aspirations, and 
the propensity to upgrade and learn new skills. Most obviously, high and progressive labor 
taxes lower the rate of return on productive skills, and therefore they are likely to impair the 
supply of skilled workers.
30 They also slow down restructuring and the reallocation of people 
across firms, since it becomes more costly to obtain the net wage differential necessary to 
induce a person to quit their current employment position.  
To the extent that inventors are taxed as wage-earners their incentives are also affected by 
the tax code for labor income. The same is true for industrialists, unless they have a large 
ownership share in the firm they manage, which is usually not the case for large firms.  
To the extent that income from entrepreneurship is taxed as wage income, the incentives 
of entrepreneurs are also affected. But one should not equate entrepreneurship and self-
employment. High taxes on labor income are likely to encourage self-employment both be-
cause the self-employed can more easily avoid reporting some of their income, convert part of 
their private consumption expenditures into tax-deductible business costs, and shift more 
highly taxed labor income to corporate or capital income taxed at a lower rate (Feldstein and 
                                                 
28 According to recent OECD statistics total government income as a share of GDP varies between 32 percent in 
Japan/Korea and 59 percent in Sweden (in 2005). The average for the euro area is 45 percent (OECD 2006).  
29 It should be apparent from this table that a tax system easily becomes arcane, offering opportunities to tax 
lawyers and businessmen to profit from novel ways to structure business activities in order to lower the effective 
rate of taxation: a textbook example of unproductive entrepreneurship. 
30 The incentives to acquire human capital through formal schooling may be strong thanks to low or zero tuition 
fees, subsidized student loans and housing financed by taxes, while high marginal taxes abate the incentives to 
use and further develop that kind of capital.    16
Slemrod 1980). These mechanisms are likely to both affect the selection of individuals who 
become self-employed and to discourage growth beyond a certain threshold level where it 
becomes more difficult to exploit these tax-avoidance strategies.
31 
Table 1  Different Types of Taxes with an Impact on the Actors in the Competence Bloc. 
Labor taxation 
–  level and degree of progressivity 
–  EITC/exemptions 
–  social security contributions 
– level and degree of actuarialness 
– capped/non-capped 
Taxation of savings 
–  level and degree of progressivity  
–  differences across instruments 
–  preferential treatment of pension 
savings 
–  differences across actors 
Sales/VAT 
–  level 
–  degree of uniformity 
–  exemptions 
Corporate taxation 
–  level and degree of progressivity  
–  statutory rate/effective rate 
–  S-corporations or other measures to 
eliminate two-tier taxation 
–  accounting measures to lower effec-
tive taxation  
–  treatment of holding companies 
–  domestic/foreign 
–  single- or multi-level taxation 
Taxation of stock options 
–  capital or labor income 
–  tax on realized or imputed gain 
–  differences based on holding period 
–  effect of employment clause 
Taxation at owner’s level 
–  level and degree of progressivity  
–  differential across types of owner 
–  exemption levels/threshold effects 
 
Taxation of current capital income 
–  level and degree of progressivity  
–  dividends 
–  interest income 
–  exemptions 
Degree of symmetry in the tax treatment of 
business profits and losses 
–  against other types of income 
–  against future profits 
–  effect of progressivity 
Taxation of capital gains  
–  level and degree of progressivity 
–  differences across assets 
–  differences based on holding period 
–  exemptions 
Taxation of venture capital and private 
equity activity 
–  tax treatment of managers’ and 
partners’ income 
–  taxation at one or several layers 
Taxation on asset holdings 
–  level and degree of progressivity  
–  wealth tax 
–  property tax 
–  inheritance tax 
–  exemptions 
 
Note: For all types of taxes it matters whether nominal or real incomes are taxed.  
 
                                                 
31 See Asoni and Sanandaji (2008) for a formal analysis of these effects.   17
In other words, high labor taxation may induce people to become self-employed, but it is like-
ly to weaken their incentives to develop HGFs. But this conclusion is still too simplistic. 
From a tax perspective entrepreneurial income can show up in many other forms: Dividends, 
capital gains on equity and/or stock options, and as interest income on lending by the entre-
preneur to her/his own business. Given the complexity of the tax code in a typical OECD 
country, the incentive effects of the tax system on entrepreneurs are highly multifaceted. Still, 
it is clear that some of the returns to entrepreneurial effort are taxed as wage income. The tax 
code may restrict the extent to which income accruing from closely held companies may be 
taxed as capital income.
32 In addition, some of the entrepreneurial function is carried out by 
employees without an ownership stake in the firm, and for them the labor tax schedule is al-
ways applicable. 
The level and progressivity of labor income taxation also indirectly affect the industry 
structure from the demand side. A large percentage of all work, most notably household work, 
is performed outside the market. Cross-country comparisons of industry-level employment 
also point to considerable scope for substitution of certain economic activities between the 
market and non-market sectors (Rogerson 2006; Freeman and Schettkat 2005).  
In a well-functioning, decentralized market economy, firms can be expected to detect and 
act upon the potential for starting new operations or expand existing ones, thereby creating 
job opportunities. But for many goods (e.g., high-tech products like computers), the higher 
price that results from taxation may cause the consumer to forego a purchase, or to buy a low-
er quality version of the good. This need not be the case with services – high labor taxes often 
induce the consumer to produce the service himself.
33 High rates of personal taxation tend to 
make it more profitable to shift a large share of the service production to the informal econo-
my, in particular into the “do-it-yourself” sector.  
As a result, the emergence of a large, efficient service sector competing successfully with 
unpaid work is less likely in countries with high rates of personal taxation. Consequently, 
important opportunities for commercial exploitation and entrepreneurial business develop-
ment become less accessible. When services are provided by professionals, incentives emerge 
to invest in new knowledge, to develop more effective tools, to develop superior contractual 
                                                 
32 This is true for Sweden, where the so-called 3:12 rules restrict how much of profits from closely held firms 
that can be taxed as dividends and not as wage income by the owners. See Agell et al. (1998), and Davis and 
Henrekson (2007). 
33 This basic insight constitutes an important point of departure in recent work in the theory of optimal taxation. 
The theoretical results of Kleven Jacobsen et al. (2000) and Piggott and Whalley (2001) strongly suggest that the 
optimal tax structure involves a relatively low tax rate on those market-produced services that could alternatively 
be produced in the household sector. See also Jansson (2006).   18
arrangements, to create more flexible organizational structures and so forth. Put simply, high-
er rates of personal taxation discourage the market provision of goods and services that substi-
tute closely for home-produced services.
34  
Thus, the tax burden on personal income steers consumer demand towards sophisticated 
material goods and low-priced goods that are complements to one’s own time. In countries 
where the taxation of personal income is high the competent customers are therefore more 
likely to be either firms or public entities buying intermediate goods or individuals demanding 
goods that are difficult to produce in the household or in the underground economy.  
 
5.2 Sales tax/VAT 
The incidence of commodity taxation generally falls on final domestic consumers, while in-
termediate goods and exports are exempted. Hence, the effects of these taxes on the actors of 
the competence blocs are similar to the effects of labor taxation. In some countries certain 
commodities such as personal services and merit goods are exempted or taxed at lower rates, 
while some goods (alcohol, energy etc.) are taxed more heavily. Generally, there is considera-
ble differentiation in sales/VAT taxation across countries and commodity groups.  
 
5.3 Taxation of Stock Options  
One mechanism to encourage and reward individuals supplying key competencies to a firm is 
the use of stock options. In ideal circumstances this can provide incentives that closely mimic 
direct ownership. This is likely to be most important for employed inventors, entrepreneurs 
and industrialists in certain industries where options are an effective response to agency prob-
lems. 
The efficiency of stock options is highly dependent on the tax code. If gains on stock op-
tions are taxed as wage income when the stock options are tied to employment in the firm 
some of the incentive effect is lost. This is particularly true if the gains are subject to (un-
capped) social security contributions and if the marginal tax rate is high. 
The situation is very different if an employee who accepts stock options can defer the tax 
liability to the time when the stocks received upon exercise of the options are eventually sold. 
The effectiveness is further reinforced if there are no tax consequences to the employee upon 
the granting or the exercise of the option and if the employee is taxed at a low capital gains 
rate when the stock acquired through the exercise of the option is sold. In the latter case the 
                                                 
34 See Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008), Rogerson (2006) and Davis and Henrekson (2005) for assessments of 
these effects across OECD-countries.   19
tax risk of the options is pushed back to the government. This accomplishes two things: It 
increases the potential profit from the stock options and it allows budget-constrained individ-
uals to sell stocks whenever they choose to do so. It is noteworthy that the U.S. changed the 
tax code in the early 1980s along the latter lines, which paved the way for a wave of entrepre-
neurial ventures in Silicon Valley and elsewhere (Misher 1984; Gompers and Lerner 2001). 
 
5.4 Taxation of Current Capital Income 
Current capital income consists of interest income and dividends on equity holdings. Tax sys-
tems may differ in important respects here: (i) Labor income and capital income can either be 
summed and taxed according to the same tax schedule, and if the income tax is progressive 
this may result in very high taxes on capital income, in particular if the tax rate applies to no-
minal as opposed to real returns; (ii) capital income can be taxed separately from labor in-
come, either at a flat or progressive rate with or without inflation adjustment; (iii) dividends 
may be taxed at a lower rate reflecting the fact that dividends as opposed to interest payments 
is a tax-deductible business cost for the firm; (iv) the tax code may put restrictions on the 
payment of dividends to the owners of closely held firms in order to prevent active owners 
from converting labor income into capital income taxed at a lower rate.
35 Moreover, tax sys-
tems may differ as to whether deduction of interest payments is allowed (in real or nominal 
terms).  
Hence, the tax code pertaining to current capital income has large incentive effects, espe-
cially for entrepreneurs and the functioning of secondary markets. In particular, if taxation is 
nominal and tax rates are high, the real rate of taxation can easily exceed 100 percent even at 
moderate inflation rates. On the other hand, this may be largely offset by tax deductibility of 




5.5 Taxation of Capital Gains 
Most of the economic return from the successful building of an HGF comes in the form of a 
steeply increased market value of its stock rather than as dividends or large interest payments 
to the owners. As a result, the taxation of capital gains on stock holdings has large effects on 
the incentives to create wealth through the fostering of HGFs.  
                                                 
35 In this respect it is noteworthy that in the U.S. dividends in the so-called S-corporations are only taxed at the 
level of the owner’s personal income tax (Cullen and Gordon 2006). 
36 Fukao and Hanazaki (1987) provide systematic evidence of such effects for OECD countries in the 1970s and 
1980s.   20
There are large differences across countries and over time. In some countries the tax rate 
is zero or very low on capital gains on long-term holdings of equity, thereby providing strong 
incentives for entrepreneurs to create value by investing money and effort in their own busi-
ness, and to give other key actors (industrialists and business angels) ownership stakes in the 
firm if their competencies are required. In other countries the reverse may be true, that is, the 
tax system penalizes owners of stock in closely held firms relative to owners of stock in listed 
firms in order to prevent owners of profitable small businesses from saving on taxes relative 
to the case where they are regular employees.
37  
Moreover, the capital gains tax may differ across different types of owners, where some 
types of owners, such as institutional investors and offshore trust funds, are taxed at lower 
rates than individuals. This is likely to spur an endogenous response in the ownership struc-
ture of the business sector towards the tax-favored owner categories. Generally, if individual 
stock holdings are disfavored relative to institutional holdings this affects the functioning of 
secondary markets, giving more effective control rights to fund managers and less to final 
owners.  
 
5.6 Taxation of Asset Holdings 
There are several types of taxes levied on asset holdings where the tax is decoupled from the 
return. This is true for taxes on wealth, property and inheritance. In cases where these taxes 
are non-zero, the rules for how taxable wealth is assessed in the business sector are particular-
ly important in our context. Successful entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and actors in second-
ary markets have been shown to be highly sensitive to these kinds of taxes.
38 In some systems 
corporate wealth may be exempted, which would spur investment in entrepreneurial ventures 
by key actors. Alternatively, corporate wealth may be taxed heavily, while other assets such 
as pension savings or art objects are exempted. Hence, taxes on asset holdings influence both 
the absolute and relative return on asset accumulation. In most cases where such taxes are 
levied the calculations are complicated; certain assets may be exempted and the imputed value 
used as the basis for assessments may be far below the market value.  
                                                 
37 This is the case in Sweden, where the legislator is concerned that owners of closely held firms do not convert 
labor income to capital income by paying themselves dividends taxed at 30 percent rather than wages taxed at 
the marginal tax rate for labor income. The scope for dividend payments is therefore restricted to a relatively 
small percentage of the equity capital paid in by owners. Similar provisions raise the capital gains tax on small 
businesses (Agell et al. 1998). In recent years it has normally been 43 percent for small closely held firms instead 
of the regular 30 percent, since half of the capital gain has been taxed as wage income.  
38 See Rosen (2005) for an overview. In Sweden the emigration of successful entrepreneurs was extensive due to 
very high effective taxes on wealth and inheritance, particularly during the 1970s and the 1980s (Lindqvist 
1990).    21
 
5.7 Taxation of Savings 
Given the level of wealth or national savings, the composition of national savings is not neu-
tral in its impact on entrepreneurship and small business development. The manner in which 
savings are channeled to various investment activities influences the type of business organi-
zation that can obtain credit. Pension funds, for example, are less likely to channel funds to 
entrepreneurs than business angels or venture capital firms. Hence, if the government forces 
individuals to carry out large part of their savings through a national pension fund system, 
small business credit availability will suffer relative to an alternative policy and institutional 
arrangements that allow for greater choice by individuals regarding their savings and invest-
ments. But apart from such forced measures the tax system may provide forceful incentives 
regarding the level and channeling of savings. 
Often savings in the form of life insurance are tax favored relative to other forms of sav-
ings. Insurance premiums may be tax deductible against current wage income, and the yield 
may not be subject to taxation until it is paid out. If financial assets are subject to wealth tax, 
this rarely applies to pension savings. Normally, pension savings can neither be bought back 
by the policy holder nor can it become available until a higher age. Returns on savings in mu-
tual funds may be taxed differently than savings in individual securities, in particular with 
regard to capital gains taxation where a change in the asset composition made by the invest-
ment fund has no tax consequences, while the same changes in the case of direct asset hold-
ings could result in the payment of capital gains tax. These and other similar provisions in a 
country’s tax code provide incentives to channel financial savings into institutions where it 
gets locked in for extended periods of time. Even if the institutions that handle the savings are 
not subject to any restrictions regarding their portfolio choice, these institutions cannot substi-
tute for individual equity capital in early phases of firm development. 
A tax system that encourages reliance on savings schemes that escape capital taxation typ-
ically restricts the owner’s control of the assets. In this way, the tax treatment of financial 
assets and property encourages the accumulation of illiquid assets controlled by large finan-
cial institutions rather than assets under the direct control of the owner. Personal financial 
assets with these characteristics cannot be used by the asset holder as working capital in an 
existing owner-operated business or to start a new owner-operated business. In particular, this 
would affect entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and, hence, the generation and early growth 
of HGFs.    22
If entrepreneurial talent and venture capital competence are unevenly distributed, policies 
that decrease the likelihood that the entrepreneurially talented and those with talent for being 
venture capitalists are equity constrained are likely to be beneficial. The only really efficient 
means of increasing this likelihood is to pursue economic policies that promote private wealth 
accumulation across the board, and in forms that do not preclude or severely circumscribe that 
the wealth may be used as equity in entrepreneurial ventures.
39 
 
5.8 Corporate Taxation 
Corporate tax rates have come down from very high levels, following extensive tax reforms 
throughout the OECD countries in the 1980s. Cross-country variations in the statutory corpo-
rate tax rates, however, remain large, exceeding 50 percent in Germany while no higher than 
24 percent in Ireland and 18 percent in Hungary (2003). Still, there was no correlation (r = –
0.07) between the statutory rate and corporate tax payments as a share of GDP, and Germany 
combined the highest tax rate and the lowest aggregate tax payments (OECD 2004b). In fig-
ure 2 the relationship between the statutory corporate tax rate and government revenue from 
corporate taxation in 28 OECD countries in 1980–2006 is displayed. In fact, a 1 percentage 
point higher statutory rate is associated with 0.027 percent lower revenue from corporate tax-
es as a share of GDP (significant at the 1% level). The discrepancy between statutory and ef-
fective corporate income tax rates results from mechanisms such as tax-reducing depreciation 
rules, inventory valuation rules, and other more ad hoc tax reductions that may be country or 
industry specific.
40 Seen from the perspective of the individual firm, opportunities for lower-
ing the effective tax rate induce behavioral responses by firms, and to the extent that these 
opportunities differ depending on firm and industry characteristics, effects on HGFs can be 
expected. 
 
Figure 2  Corporate Tax Rates and Corporate Tax Payments as a Share of GDP in 28 OECD 




Source: Statutory tax rates are from OECD Tax Database, PART II. Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income 
(www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/56/33717459.xls) and tax revenue from SourceOECD: Revenue Statistics of OECD 
Member Countries Database. 
 
                                                 
39 Pelikan (1988) provides forceful arguments supporting this view. 
40 See, e.g., King and Fullerton (1984) and the studies contained therein.   23
Taxes on business profits are not limited to the corporate level. Account needs to be taken of 
all taxes including the owner’s level and differences arising because of different sources of 
finance. In particular, for our purposes it is important to highlight whether there are any dif-
ferences between small individually owned firms (incorporated or unincorporated) and insti-
tutionally owned firms, which are either listed or unlisted.  
 
5.9 Taxation at the Owner’s Level 
Estimating, in real terms, the size of the marginal tax burden faced by private firms for in-
vestment in real capital is a painstaking task requiring that we consider the overall effects of 
several different taxes, such as corporate taxation with its specific rules for depreciation and 
valuation, as well as the taxation of interest income, dividends, capital gains, and wealth. In 
addition, we need to take into consideration how these tax schedules differ across different 
types of investors. A correct estimate of the tax burden must take into consideration which 
type of real capital the firms invest in, how these investments are financed, who the firm’s 
owners and creditors are, and in what industries the investments are made. Estimates have 
been made for a number of countries using the methodology developed by King and Fullerton 
(1984). 
We will use the Swedish tax system to illustrate how tax schedules affect HGFs. Table 2 
presents effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources of 
finance for Sweden in 1980 and 1994. Three categories of owners and sources of finance are 
identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is calculated assuming a real pre-tax rate of re-
turn of 10 percent. A negative number means that the real rate of return is greater after tax 
than before tax. 
The table highlights several aspects of the tax system that are potentially important deter-
minants of HGF activity. First, in 1980 debt financing received the most favorable tax treat-
ment and new share issues the least favorable treatment. Second, the taxation of households as 
owners was much higher than for other categories. In fact, more than 100 percent of the real 
rate of return was taxed away for a household buying a newly issued share. Third, tax-exempt 
institutions benefited from a large tax advantage relative to the other two categories of own-
ers. Tax-exempt institutions had a substantial relative tax advantage throughout when invest-
ing in newly issued shares.
41 Fourth, insurance companies were in an intermediate position in 
terms of effective taxation. As shown by Davis and Henrekson (1997) the tax system favored 
                                                 
41 Tax-exempt institutions by definition pay no tax on interest receipts, dividends or capital gains. This category 
includes charities, scientific and cultural foundations, foundations for employee recreation set up by companies, 
pension funds for supplementary occupational pension schemes, and the National Pension Fund.   24
large and old manufacturing firms. By implication a tax system of this type penalized many of 
the key attributes characterizing HGFs. Distortions of such magnitudes most certainly had a 
negative effect on the functioning of competence blocs and the capability of fostering rapidly 
growing firms, in particular entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors in secondary markets 
and HGFs in their infancy are likely to be negatively affected.   
 
Table 2  Effective Marginal Tax rates for Different Combinations of Owners and Sources of 
Finance in Sweden, 1980 and 1994 (real pre-tax rate of return = 10%). 
 




1980   
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9 
Tax exempt institutions  –83.4 –11.6 11.2 
Insurance companies  –54.9 38.4 28.7 
      
1994   
Households 32.0/27.0† 28.3/18.3† 36.5/26.5† 
Tax exempt institutions  –14.9 21.8 21.8 
Insurance companies  0.7 32.3 33.8 
Note: Excluding wealth tax, the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. All calculations are based 
on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates were used: 1980: 9.4%, 1994: 
3%. The calculations conform to the general framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984). The average 
holding period is assumed to be 10 years. A negative tax rate implies that the rate of return after tax is greater 
than before tax. For instance, a tax rate of –83 percent for a debt-financed investment owned by a tax-exempt 
institution in 1980 tells us that a real rate of return of 10 percent before tax becomes 18.3 percent after tax. 
Source: Södersten (1984) and calculations provided directly by Jan Södersten. 
 
A series of tax reforms from 1985 until 1994 entailed a substantial ”leveling of the playing 
field” for different types of owners and sources of finance. The tax changes of 1993–94, pri-
marily the abolishment of wealth tax on unlisted stocks and taxation of dividends at the inves-
tor level, and the lowering of capital gains taxation to 12.5 percent, brought about a dramatic 
leveling of taxation for different owners and different means of finance compared to the situa-
tion in 1980. Taxation on financing by owner equity, regardless of whether it takes the form 
of a new issue of shares or of earnings plowed back into the firm, became largely the same for 
households as for other categories of ownership.
42 This should have a positive effect on the 
generation and growth of HGFs, according to our analysis.  
 
                                                 
42 These rules were only in place for one year, and the differential across owner categories and sources of finance 
increased again in 1995 when taxation of dividends at the investor level was reintroduced and the capital gains 
tax was raised to 30 percent.   25
5.10 Symmetry in the Tax Treatment of Business Profits and Losses 
It has been argued that governments can provide insurance for business owners by taking part 
of profits in good times and offsetting losses in bad times (Domar and Musgrave 1944; Sinn 
1996). If individuals are risk averse, such insurance encourages the risk-taking central to all 
entrepreneurial activity, not least HGFs.  
A number of arguments have been put forward to counter this proposition. For instance, it 
is not valid under progressive taxation and, under most tax codes, losses can only be offset 
against future profits. It could well be that misdirected forms of insurance only serve to en-
courage new business ventures among those who are not entrepreneurs (de Meza, 2002).  
In this respect there are also large differences across countries. For instance, Cullen and 
Gordon (2006) show that the asymmetry in the tax treatment of business profits and losses is 
greater in Sweden than in the U.S.
43 In the U.S., the asymmetry actually runs the other way in 
in some cases. Cullen and Gordon write: “For individuals in the top bracket, risk taking in 
start-up firms is heavily subsidized in the U.S., but tax penalized in Sweden.”  
The usual tax asymmetry discourages risk-taking activities even for risk-neutral owners. 
Since startup activities are often risky, this effect is stronger for new firms than for incum-
bents. This difference is aggravated to the extent that small firms have more volatile profit 
streams and fewer opportunities to apply losses in some units to reduce taxes on the gains 
accruing to other units. For closely held firms, the disincentive to pursue risky activities is 
even stronger insofar as risk-averse owners have much of their wealth tied up in the firm. As 
regards the previously reported evidence that HGFs tend to be young, it is conceivable that 
such a policy has negative effects on entrepreneurial activities in general and HGFs in particu-
lar.  
 
5.11 Taxation of Venture Capital and Private Equity Activity 
As explained in section 2 venture capitalists (VC) often fill a crucial role in the development 
of a small entrepreneurial high-growth venture by converting high-risk opportunities to a 
more acceptable risk level through portfolio diversification, and adding key competencies that 
the firm may be lacking. This is achieved by means of developing arrangements that align the 
incentives of the three actors – investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial start-ups 
(Zider 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001). The extent to which this is possible is also largely 
governed by the tax code for stock options, capital gains, and whether pension funds are al-
                                                 
43 Asymmetry refers to a situation whereby the effective tax rate on business profits is greater than the fraction of 
business losses shared by the government through the tax system.   26
lowed to invest in high-risk securities issued by small or new companies and venture capital 
funds.  
Venture capitalist firms hardly ever participate in the earliest stages of the development of 
new high-risk concepts that eventually make it to the stage of successful commercialization. 
The earliest financial support is likely to come from affluent friends or relatives, or from 
wealthy individuals who have already become rich from similar earlier ventures. The tight 
screening and close monitoring of the firm’s progress by these financiers sharply reduce the 
moral hazard problems.
44 Venture capitalists would have far fewer companies to finance if it 
were not for these “business angels”. The same is true for actors in secondary markets, nota-
bly private equity (PE) firms, but here it is about aligning incentives of investors, private equi-
ty partners and the industrialists in charge of the acquired firms.
45  
The tax systems of many countries evolved before complicated ownership structures in-
volving VC/PE financing even existed.
46 Sophisticated mechanisms were needed to provide 
high-powered incentives for a number of actors in addition to the final equity holders. In fact, 
the modern VC industry in the U.S. could not evolve until the tax system was changed in key 
respects: Sharp reductions in the capital gains tax, stock option legislation of 1981 that made 
it possible to defer the tax liability to the time when the stocks were sold rather than when the 
options were exercised, and new legislation in 1979 allowing pension funds to invest in high-
risk securities issued by small or new companies and venture capital funds (Fenn et al. 1995).  
In the U.S. investments by venture capital firms are taxed at low rates. The returns that 
venture capitalists receive when the companies they help build are sold (so-called carried in-
terest) are taxed at the 15 percent capital gains rate. For the founders of the startup the capital 
gains tax rate may be half of that level (up to a high cap), since half of the gains is tax exempt 
if the stock has been held for at least five years.  
In Sweden, by contrast, domestically domiciled VC and PE firms are at a disadvantage 
relative to other firms. Until 2003 dividends were taxed threefold: At a rate of 28 percent in 
both the firm itself and the VC firm and, when applicable, at 30 percent at the owners’ level. 
Since 2003 there is no taxation at the level of the VC or PE firm as long as it owns 10 percent 
of the firm in question. Also, business angels that take active part in the management of the 
firms in which they invest are taxed at a higher rate. Active owners of unlisted firms are taxed 
                                                 
44 The reader who is interested in exploring these aspects in depth is referred to Landström (2007) and the ar-
ticles contained therein. 
45 See Wright (2007) and Prowse (1998). 
46 VC and PE ownership involves several layers of ownership: Private ownership stake by founders and key 
personnel, ownership share by VC/PE firm, ownership stake by VC/PE partners (often indirect), investor stake in 
the VC/PE fund and final beneficiaries of institutions investing in VC/PE funds.   27
at higher rates than passive owners in that dividends above a fairly moderate threshold is 
taxed as wage income, and capital gains are also largely taxed as wage income and not as cap-
ital income. Likewise, the income of the general partners in VC firms and income from and 
stock options tied to employment are taxed as wage income. Thus, the high rates of taxation 
of entrepreneurs, general partners of VC firms and the owners of the VC firms or the business 
angels result in a substantial reduction in the after-tax return on activities typical of VC firms 
in the U.S.  
On the other hand, the Swedish VC and PE industries have developed offshore ownership 
structures that are very tax efficient, but where the thresholds are high and transparency is low 
or negligible. More generally, taxation of the VC and PE industries should be evaluated in the 
light of the extent to which venture capital and private equity firms can operate from offshore 
tax havens. A tax code providing generous opportunities for such behavior offers a safety 
valve to circumvent onerous taxation, but it also puts VC and PE firms at an advantage rela-
tive to other actors (stockholders of publicly listed firms, family owners etc.) including indi-
vidual entrepreneurs.  
Strategies for bridging the gap between founders of firms and external financiers, strate-
gies differ considerably across countries (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2005). In the U.S., venture ca-
pitalists often buy out the start-up entrepreneur at an early stage in the life-cycle of the firm 
(Hellmann and Puri 2002; Norbäck and Persson, 2008). The entrepreneur loses control, but 
often becomes quite wealthy when the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur exit in an IPO 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001). Venture capitalists, and sometimes entrepreneurs, use the 
proceeds of IPOs to invest in new entrepreneurial ventures. In contrast, Swedish entrepreneurs 
often cling to control throughout their entire careers, showing a strong unwillingness to give 
up control rights to external financiers (Wiklund et al. 2003, Berggren et al. 2000). Greater 
emphasis on control rather than growth is consistent with the Swedish tax system, and it may 
be an important factor explaining the fact that few Swedish firms founded in recent decades 
have grown to large size.
47  
 
5.12 Summary of the Effects of Taxation 
In order to fully evaluate the effect of the tax system on the incentives for HGFs, it is neces-
sary to take account of the overall effects of all taxes combined.  
                                                 
47 In 2004, among the 100 largest firms in Sweden, including firms formed by government and firms established 
by foreigners, there were 34 firms originally founded by Swedish entrepreneurs. The median year of establish-
ment of these firms was 1908 and no one was founded after 1970 (Axelsson 2006).    28
Let us first consider the occupational choice decision of economic actors, i.e., whether to 
acquire and use any of the key competencies crucial for HGFs. It is clear from our analyses of 
the tax system that these choices depend on the complex interplay of a number of tax rates 
and tax code provisions, and the incentives for savings in general and in forms that are ame-
nable to equity financing.  
The analysis reveals that tax systems typically contain many asymmetries giving rise to 
distortions concerning, for instance, ownership and firm age, which is expected to have a neg-
ative effect on the functioning of competence blocs and the ability to generate HGFs. One 
illustration is given in table 3, which reports some important aspects pertaining to the taxation 
of shareholding in OECD countries. In some key respects it is clear that there is always a 
group of countries where taxation is zero, while this is not the case in the tax code of other 
comparable countries. Despite recent trends towards tax harmonization within the EU and the 
OECD, it is clear that there exist innumerable combinations of tax rates and tax provisions 
giving rise to different blends of ownership structure, financing structure, industry structure, 
size distribution of firms and employment dynamics across countries.  
Even seemingly neutral taxation may give rise to distortions if, for instance, some actors 
and firms are more likely to be financially constrained, notably small firms.
48 Such examples 
are corporate taxation, taxation on savings and taxation on private wealth where small and 
young firms to a larger extent rely on retained earnings and private equity. In our view, this is 
an important determinant of cross-country differences in the prevalence of HGFs. Likewise, 
the regulatory (tax) burden is likely to fall more heavily on small and young firms (and hence 
on potential HGFs), since the concomitant administrative costs have a large fixed component 
that is unrelated to the size of the firm. This is recognized in a number of countries identifying 
the regulatory burden itself as an impediment to economic development, in particular for 
young and small firms (see, e.g., European Commission 2007). Many governments have 
therefore commissioned authorities to document and reduce the regulatory burden of (small) 
firms. The establishment of the Office of Advocacy within the U.S. Small Business Adminis-
tration in 1976 is an early example. In the Lisbon agenda the European Union stated the ambi-
tion to reduce the regulatory burden of firms by 25 percent until 2011. 
Our analysis of the effect of the tax system on incentives for HGFs leads to three conclu-
sions:  
(i)  The tax system is likely to have far-reaching effects.  
                                                 
48 See, for instance, Beck et al. (2005), and Angelini and Generale (2008).    29
(ii)  To identify the incentive effects for the key actors in the competence bloc, the tax 
code has to be examined at a detailed level. Hence, cross-country studies trying to 
explain differences in industry structure, the size distribution of firms, the preva-
lence of HGFs and the like by using raw tax rates or other aggregate tax-system 
indicators as regressors may be misleading.  
(iii)  A number of common features of tax systems lead to large distortions, disfavoring 
infant HGFs, and hence have an expected negative effect on renewal, employment 
and economic growth.  
A further summary of the effect of the tax system on the different actors in the competence 
bloc is provided in table 4. 
 
Table 3  Some Important Aspects of the Taxation of Shareholders in Selected Industrialized 
Countries, 2003. 
No or reduced 
taxation of divi-
dends at the 
owner level 
No wealth tax   Low wealth tax/ 
large exemptions 
and/or low/no taxa-
tion of dividends 
No capital 
gains tax on 
long-term hold-
ings 
Capital gains tax 
> 0 but ≤ 20% 
on long-term 
holdings 
Finland Australia  Finland  Belgium  Ireland 
France Belgium  France Denmark  Italy 
Greece Denmark  Luxemburg  Greece  Japan 
Italy Greece Switzerland  Korea  Luxemburg‡ 
Luxemburg Ireland  Spain  Luxemburg  Norway 
Norway Italy    Mexico  Spain 
New Zealand*  Japan    Netherlands  U.S.A. 
Spain Canada    Poland  Canada 
U.K. Netherlands    Portugal  Iceland 
Germany New  Zealand    U.K.#   
 Poland    Germany   
 Portugal    Austria   
 U.K.    Czech  Republic   
 Germany    New  Zealand   
 U.S.A.    Switzerland   
 Austria       
Notes: #Large exemption. †Effective as of 2001. ‡50% of the income tax rate, i.e., a maximum rate of 23%. The 
definition of ”long-term holdings” varies between 3 months and 5 years. In some instances the situation refers to 
a representative case. 
Sources: The Federation of Swedish Enterprise, Institutet för Utländsk Rätt and European Tax Handbook (pub-
lished by KPMG). 
   30
 
Table 4  Taxation and the Actors in the Competence Bloc. 
 
Type of tax  Actors affected 
Labor taxation  Entrepreneurs, inventors, industrialists, skilled labor, 
competent customers 
Sales/VAT  Very similar to the effects of labor taxation 
Taxation of stock options  Entrepreneurs, inventors, industrialists 
Taxation of current capital income  Entrepreneurs, actors in secondary markets 
Taxation of capital gains  Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors in second-
ary markets 
Taxation on asset holdings  Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors on second-
ary market 
Taxation of savings  Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors in second-
ary markets 
Corporate taxation  No direct effect on actors, negative effect on HGFs 
since more dependent on equity capital 
Taxation at owner’s level  Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors in second-
ary markets 
Degree of symmetry in the tax treat-
ment of business profits and losses 
Entrepreneurs  
Taxation of venture capital and private 
equity activity 




6. The Organization of Labor Markets 
Many of the empirical studies of job flows and worker flows are from the 1990s. While there 
are far fewer recent papers on this topic, there is reason to believe that the two main results 
summarized by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) still hold. First, job creation and destruction 
flows are large and persistent, with 10 to 15 percent of all jobs in the private sector being de-
stroyed each year. Second, the overwhelming share of these job flows take place within nar-
rowly defined sectors of the economy. According to a variety of studies only about 10 percent 
of reallocation reflects shifts of employment opportunities across 4-digit industries. Based on 
the existing empirical literature Caballero (2007, p. 24) maintains that more than 50 percent of 
aggregate productivity growth emanates from reallocation across plants/firms in the same 
industry, and 20–50 percent can be attributed to the effect of entry and exit in narrowly de-
fined industries. Caballero also shows that the gross flow of workers is higher in firms with 
high productivity growth. Taken together these observations point to the importance of expe-
rimentation and selection.  
Moreover, studies using matched employer-employee data reveal very large churning, i.e., 
hires and separations in excess of total job creation and destruction (Abowd and Kramarz   31
1999). In other words, worker flows are much larger than job flows, perhaps as much as twice 
the volume. For instance, Westergård-Nielsen and Bingley (1998) find that among growing 
establishments in Denmark two hires must be made for each net job created.  
Hence, labor studies document massive ongoing restructuring of jobs and workers across 
firms. It is reasonable to hypothesize that HGFs and potential HGFs are more in need of flex-
ibility and freedom of contracting in order to realize their high-growth potential. Institutions 
hampering the freedom of contracting curtail the possible combinations of factors of produc-
tion. The large productivity differentials across firms in the same industry indicate that labor 
productivity controlling for skills/competencies can vary dramatically depending on who is 
the manager/entrepreneur.  
In this section we will examine the impact of labor market institutions on the functioning 
and efficiency of the competence bloc. We focus on three labor market institutions of particu-
lar importance for the economy’s ability to generate HGFs: (i) Labor market regulations, es-
pecially concerning job security mandates; (ii) wage-setting institutions; and (iii) the social 
insurance system. 
 
6.1 The Regulation of Labor Markets 
There are large cross-country differences in the extent of labor market regulations. OECD 
(1994) compares the extent of government regulations on labor standards by measuring five 
different aspects: Working time, fixed-term contracts, employment protection, minimum 
wages and employee representation rights. In each of these aspects, a country is ranked on a 
scale of 0, 1, and 2, where a 2 represents the highest degree of regulation. Adding the five 
aspects together produces an index ranging in value from 0 to 10. Of the 18 countries included 
in the survey, Greece and Sweden exhibited the highest index value (8 and 7 points, respec-
tively). The average for all European countries was 4.9. The U.S. scored a zero and Canada 
2.
49 
The empirical findings about churning and restructuring give reasons to believe that in 
particular strict employment security provisions and other regulations that restrict contracting 
flexibility are more harmful for enterprises that would like to grow rapidly. As an employer 
learns about a worker’s abilities over time, or as those abilities evolve with the accumulation 
of experience, the optimal assignment of the worker to various tasks is likely to change. The 
scope for task reassignment within the firm can be expected to rise with firm size. In an unfet-
                                                 
49 OECD (2004a) provides an update of the 1994 study, although less comprehensive, covering employment 
protection only.   32
tered labor market, optimal task reassignment often involves mobility between firms, and 
such mobility is more likely when the initial employment relationship involves a small, often 
young, business. For instance, Schnabel et al. (2008) report that employment stability (meas-
ured as time employed in the same firm) is higher and the risk for becoming unemployed 
lower in incumbent firms than in newly founded firms. Moreover, both the rate at which 
workers separate from jobs and the rate at which employers destroy job positions decline with 
the size, age and capital intensity of the employer (Brown and Medoff 1989; Davis and Hal-
tiwanger 1999). Bartelsman et al. (2004, p. 4) claim that there is much more churning among 
young and small firms compared to old and large ones. In a meta-analysis of employment 
creation studies, van Praag and Versloot (2007, p. 360) conclude that “employment dynamics 
are larger in entrepreneurial firms”.
50 These patterns in worker separation and job destruction 
rates suggest that any costs imposed by labor security regulation are likely to fall more heavi-
ly on younger, smaller and less capital-intensive (often service) employers. Since HGFs are 
overrepresented in these categories, this implies that labor security regulations disproportio-
nately burden HGFs.  
Strict application of the principle of ”last in – first out” in case of redundancies also im-
plies that tenure at the current employer becomes relatively more important for labor security 
than individual skill and productivity. This fact increases an employee’s opportunity cost of 
changing employers or of leaving a secure salaried job to become self-employed.  
If regular employment is highly regulated there may be strong incentives to devise ar-
rangements that circumvent the regulations. In several European countries new forms of flex-
ibility have emerged, leading to more job opportunities (Blau and Kahn 1999). The most im-
portant of these arrangements are increased self-employment, the emergence of an under-
ground economy where the government refrains from enforcing regulations, and increased 
reliance on temporary employment.
51 It is likely that part of the increase in self-employment 
in recent years is driven by such considerations. For the self-employed, compensation and 
working hours are totally unregulated and no labor security is mandated. Also, very small 
firms may be able to avoid unionization and the signing of collective agreements, and there-
fore benefit from greater freedom of contracting. This room of maneuver is likely to be lost 
once the firm size exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, these evasive measures do little to 
help HGFs. Instead, they tend to create a system with a large share of economic activity oc-
                                                 
50 They define entrepreneurial firms as smaller and younger firms.  
51 Arai and Heyman (2004) report that temporary job flows in Sweden in the 1990s were as much as ten times 
higher than job flows for permanent contracts. See also Shane (2008).   33
curring in small firms without the ability or the aspiration to become HGFs.
52 The differential 
effect of labor market regulations may go a long way towards explaining why the rate of self-
employment is fairly low in the U.S., while it is very high in Italy. One may hypothesize that 
in the U.S. the really good entrepreneurial firms are more likely to grow rapidly, while the 
onerous regulation, possibly in combination with the high tax rates on labor income, makes it 
difficult and risky to build large firms in Italy. Instead, the firms tend to remain small and 
resort to a strategy of cooperation with other small firms in clusters (Lazerson and Lorenzoni 
1999). 
 
6.2 Wage-setting Institutions 
Wage-setting institutions may impact on the functioning of the competence bloc and the con-
ditions for (potential) HGFs through several channels. In particular, the wage compression 
associated with centralized wage bargaining is likely to disadvantage smaller and younger 
businesses, particularly in services (i.e., the most likely potential HGFs). Wages are consis-
tently higher at larger employers, even after exhaustive efforts to control for observable work-
er characteristics and other job attributes (Oi and Idson 1999).  
Also, on average old firms pay higher wages than new firms and industries in the low-end 
of the wage distribution are found in services, not in manufacturing.
53 Centralized wage-
setting institutions disadvantage potential HGFs by implementing standard rate compensation 
policies that closely tie wages to easily observed job and worker characteristics such as occu-
pation, education, experience and seniority.
54 In their study of the size-wage structure in the 
U.S. manufacturing sector, Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) find that residual wage dispersion 
declines sharply with establishment size in standard human capital regressions that relate 
worker earnings to sex, education, experience and job tenure.  
Halabisky et al. (2006) explicitly investigate the development of wages in HGFs com-
pared to other firms with the purpose to examine the validity of the argument that the job con-
tribution of smaller firms is less valuable since they pay lower wages than larger firms. They 
find that larger firms paid higher wages, but – consistent with the other studies reported in 
                                                 
52 These opposing effects are also consistent with the findings of Robson (2003) and Torrini (2005), who do not 
find any relationship between the rate of self-employment and the degree of regulation of labor markets in rich 
countries. 
53 Garen (1985) and Kremer (1993) develop theoretical models that explain the systematic sorting of more pro-
ductive workers to larger employers as an efficiency-enhancing outcome in economies with heterogeneous, im-
perfectly substitutable labor. 
54 Freeman (1988), Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) and Blau and Kahn (1996) provide evidence that unions 
and other centralized wage-setting institutions compress wages among observationally similar workers by pro-
moting standard rate compensation policies.   34
section 3 – that these firms are concentrated in slowly growing and declining industries. On 
the other hand, wages grew most rapidly in HGFs, among which small firms were overrepre-
sented. Halabisky et al. maintain that this is in line with the idea that the development of 
wages reflects firm performance and conclude (p. 265): “In other words, for small firms, wage 
levels were highest in those that grow the fastest. This suggests that firms that might have 
started out small and paid low wages can afford to increase wages faster as the company 
grows and becomes more successful and more productive.”  
Given the large intra-firm differences in productivity and productivity growth, in particu-
lar in young and rapidly expanding industries and young firms (Caballero 2007), it is clear 
that the functioning of the competence bloc for HGFs is impaired if wages are set in negotia-
tions far from the individual workplace, and therefore not taking these facts into proper ac-
count.  
 
6.3 Labor Markets and the Social Insurance System 
By providing insurance for unfavorable outcomes, an extensive and generous public social 
insurance system can in principle encourage individuals to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors. 
This is a valid theoretical point shown formally by Sinn (1996), but it is an open question 
whether it is important empirically. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has yet to be tested 
empirically. At first sight it appears more clear-cut that a generous welfare system makes it 
less costly to bear uncertainty as an entrepreneur or transfer to a risky job in an entrepreneuri-
al firm. In labor markets where job security is closely linked to job tenure, this may no longer 
hold; what matters is the opportunity cost, i.e., how much an employee has to give up in terms 
of income security if (s)he transfers to self-employment or a risky job in an entrepreneurial 
firm. For a tenured employee (with a low-risk employer), the opportunity cost rises consider-
ably in many OECD countries.  
We can illustrate this point by comparing the situation in Sweden and Denmark. In Den-
mark, generous welfare systems are combined with weak job security mandates, sometimes 
called “flexicurity” (Andersen 2005). In Sweden, the situation is very different. If employ-
ment with the current employer has lasted for a long time, and the employer is unlikely to be 
forced to shut down, the system in reality provides income security for the individual.
55 By 
contrast, somebody who voluntarily gives up a tenured position for self-employment may 
often end up having no more security than what is provided by (means-tested) social welfare, 
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and this presupposes that the individual depletes all her own assets. Hence, the construction of 
the public income insurance systems in combination with the labor security legislation tends 
to penalize individuals who assume entrepreneurial risk. As a result, the opportunity cost of 
giving up a tenured position in Denmark is substantially lower than in Sweden. In a study of 
business start-ups among the whole science and technology labor force in Sweden, Delmar et 
al. (2005) report that employees and students often prefer unemployment and further educa-
tion to starting a business of their own when facing unemployment.
56 In total, only 3.5 percent 
of the science and technology labor force started a new business during the studied period 
(1990–2000), and firm growth is reported to have low priority among them. A major explana-
tion is that employees and unemployed are embraced by the social security system, such as 
income insurance, whereas the de facto income insurance of self-employed is weak or non-
existent. Thus, many are unwilling to forgo a large part of their social security benefits for 
uncertain entrepreneurial incomes.  
A final point concerns the design of the supplementary pension system and other impor-
tant benefits that may be tied to employment, notably health insurance. Supplementary 
pension plans that are not fully actuarial and individualized contain elements of redistribution 
and risk-sharing across individuals in a group, e.g., the white-collar workers in a certain in-
dustry. The pension benefit level may be disproportionately tied to the wage level achieved at 
the end of the professional career. To the extent that this is true, the mobility of (older) work-
ers across firms is greatly discouraged, as well as the hiring of elderly unemployed.  
 
6.4 Summary of the Effects of Labor Market Regulations  
The degree of regulation and design of labor markets, wage-setting and social insurance sys-
tems can be expected to influence incentives for potential HGFs and existing HGFs, by re-
stricting the freedom of contracting and thereby curtailing the possible combinations of fac-
tors of production. The need for experimentation in order to find more efficient factor combi-
nations is likely to be larger in new firms and industries in general, and in current HGFs or 
potential HGFs in particular.  
The most important channel by which labor market institutions affect HGFs is by hamper-
ing the supply of skilled workers to firms undergoing expansion and/or change. Given the 
large worker flows required in a dynamic economy, it will be harder to recruit workers with 
the competencies needed: The opportunity cost of leaving a tenured position goes up for the 
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employees, the fixed cost of hiring goes up when a bad recruitment becomes more costly to 
reverse; there may be threshold effects that make firms hesitant to expand beyond a certain 
size, and a great deal of entrepreneurial effort may need to be expended on evasive rather than 
directly productive activities.  
A fundamental insight from the theory of the competence bloc is that experimentation and 
selection not only takes place across firms, but also between workers and other key actors 
(notably entrepreneurs) whose productivity is only revealed in the course of working. If tem-
porary contracts are used systematically in order to circumvent regulations tied to permanent 
employment, industries and business ideas that depend on high-skilled labor and on-the-job 
learning are disadvantaged. Legal and institutional hurdles that prevent firms from laying off 
workers that underperform, discourage potential HGFs from expanding. Depending on how 
labor markets are regulated and how these regulations interact with the social insurance sys-
tem, the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed is affected. When social security bene-
fits are closely tied to tenured positions and the employee has tenure at a low-risk employer 
the opportunity cost increases heavily in many OECD countries. If employees who establish 
their own business loose part of their social security entitlements, this can be expected to im-
pact negatively on the recruitment of entrepreneurs.  
 
7. The Regulation of Product Markets  
Competence bloc theory identifies the right for private entrepreneurs to enter markets and the 
right for customers to buy preferred products and qualities from preferred suppliers as crucial 
for economic development and firm growth. In recent decades, developed countries have ex-
perienced a wave of deregulations of product markets aimed at increasing the contestability of 
markets and providing more opportunities for private entrepreneurship, e.g., in telecommuni-
cations, transportation and financial services. This can be expected to lead to larger scope for 
the emergence of new competence blocs and HGFs. 
One central segment of the economy of many advanced economies, however, remains 
heavily regulated and in some cases even monopolized by the public sector: The provision of 
private good social services such as health care, care of children and the elderly, and educa-
tion. The social benefits from well-functioning competence blocs in these areas are likely to 
be substantial. These industries already constitute a considerable share of GDP: About 30 
percent of GDP in the Scandinavian welfare states, and about 20 percent in OECD (Adema 
2001, Adema and Ladaique (2005), and Andersen 2008). These industries will meet an in-  37
creasing demand from aging and wealthier populations. The income elasticity of services pro-
vided by these industries has been estimated to be as high as 1.6 (Fogel 1999). While several 
of these markets have been partially opened for private competition in recent years, many 
impediments are still in place, with private firms still producing only a fraction of total output. 
We discuss three types of regulations separately: (i) The case where private production is 
permitted, but financing is monopolized; (ii) the case where production is monopolized by 
local or central government, but private financing is allowed; and (iii) the case where produc-
tion and financing are both monopolized by local or central government 
 
7.1 Private Production and Public Financing 
Ensuring access to health care and other social goods and services does not require govern-
ment production of such goods, only public financing. Welfare states are increasingly experi-
menting with combinations of public financing and private provision of these services, there-
by introducing a market-type mechanism.
57 The most common instruments are outsourcing 
(“contracting out”) and vouchers. Public-private partnerships have become more common in 
infrastructure project; see Rosenau Vaillancourt (2000) for an evaluation of the use of public-
private partnerships in different policy areas.  
The combination of private provision and public financing poses problems for the creation 
of competence blocs and HGFs. First, the government is a monopsonist in a number of prod-
uct markets. The consumer is eligible for a certain service or good free of charge, but only 
from the provider commissioned by the government. The service provider typically has li-
mited options to offer and charge for additional services on top of what is granted through the 
tax-financed system. These restrictions make it difficult for consumers to express their prefe-
rences and their willingness to pay via market transactions, counteracting the use of custom-
ers’ private information about their needs and requirements and about the quality of the ser-
vice providers. These restrictions blunt the incentives and ability to acquire competence for 
entrepreneurs, industrialists, venture capitalists and actors in secondary markets, resulting in a 
lack of depth of such competencies in these industries. 
In markets where the producers know more than the end user about the product, customers 
act indirectly via middlemen who reduce the associated problem of asymmetric information 
(see, e.g., Klein 2001). For example, the final borrower and final lender seldom contract di-
rectly in the credit market. Instead, the transactions are made via an intermediary, usually a 
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bank. The intermediary has specialized knowledge and can in many cases function as a com-
petent customer. Such intermediaries become scarce under a regime of public financing. In 
some markets, the government monopolizes intermediary functions as well (for instance, the 
labor exchange in Sweden was monopolized until 1993). In the case where the government 
intervenes to become the sole buyer of goods and services prices are usually regulated as well.  
Second, a common pattern is that the government does not legally prohibit private provi-
sion of services like health care and non-mandatory schooling, but simply crowds out private 
producers by failing to level the playing field in these markets. In particular, the public sector 
may offer the service free of charge, financed through taxes in combination with the banning 
of customers from being eligible for any subsidies when buying from a private provider. Oc-
casionally it is suggested that private enterprises providing publicly financed services should 
be prohibited from making profit, and required to reinvest all surplus in the firm.
58 While such 
provision constitutes no impediment for private non-profit foundations (such as universities 
and many U.S. hospitals), it weakens the incentives for entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, 
whose competencies are crucial to the formation of competence blocs and HGFs. 
The mix of public financing and private provision does not preclude competence blocs 
and HGFs, but it is likely to give rise to incomplete blocs. This is mainly due to the lack of 
competent customers, since all private customers are prohibited.
59 In case there is a de facto 
ban on profit, there will be no complete competence blocs and no private HGFs. Nevertheless, 
in many instances opening previously monopolized markets to private providers has led to 
impressive performance of HGFs suggesting that there is a large untapped potential for this in 
sectors such as health care, education and care of children and the elderly. One such example 
is the voucher system for school choice that was introduced in Sweden in the early 1990s, 
which paved the way for several HGFs in the area. At about the same time local and regional 
governments began to outsource health care, and from this a number of HGFs have emerged, 
and some of them have become multinational.
60  
 
7.2 Public Production and Private Financing 
There are a few markets, mainly infrastructure, where government monopolizes production, 
but where private financing is allowed, even as the main source of funding. Electricity supply, 
                                                 
58 This was explicitly suggested by a government expert investigation in Sweden in 2002 (SOU 2002:31). 
59 An exception is when the government purchases goods and services to their core activities, e.g., national de-
fense.  
60 One of the most well-known examples is the health care provider Capio founded in Sweden in 1994. In 2008 
Capio had 16,500 employees in eight countries. There are also several large operators in elderly care, which are 
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garbage collection, telecommunications, postal services, public transportation and water 
supply are prime examples.  
Entrepreneurship channeled through private firms has no role if the provision of a good is 
monopolized by government. This is likely to reduce efficiency and innovative activity in 
these markets. Public enterprises are sometimes lucky enough to have intrapreneurs, hospital 
managers, school principals or college deans that improve performance through innovation 
and the build-up of structural capital. But in this system establishments that are better ma-
naged or otherwise above average in performance have little opportunity and weak incentives 
to expand and improve quality across the board. 
Venture capitalists that increase firm value through active ownership are redundant in 
such markets. VC profits are typically realized via exit through sale in a secondary market. 
When production is monopolized competencies of venture capitalists and actors in secondary 
markets will be absent, since there are no investment opportunities. Similarly, the build-up of 
industrial competence is negligible when the acquisition and use of such competence is re-
stricted. 
State ownership makes management less interested in innovation activities, since it is 
more difficult for them to reap any benefits from these activities compared to private owners 
(see, e.g., Shleifer 1998).
61 This implies that it is difficult for inventors to earn returns on their 
efforts in excess of their salary, which in general is much less than the market value of poten-
tially successful inventions. Thus, while research and development may be subsidized, the 
incentives for inventors themselves are weakened.
62 Moreover, their labor market is monop-
sonized, which will make the salary lower than in a market with many competing producers. 
This reasoning also applies to skilled workers. Hence, wages for skilled workers in monopo-
lized industries may go down, leading to a scarcity of skilled workers. 
 
7.3 Public Production and Public Financing 
The effect of government monopolization of production and financing on competence blocs 
and HGFs are similar to the case of government monopolization of production. Critical entre-
preneurial and venture capitalist competencies cannot exist. Actors in secondary markets can-
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tional approaches in the literature on regulation and procurement, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993), who study 
issues like adverse selection and moral hazard stemming from incomplete information in contracting. 
62 This should be separated from the rate of innovation for inputs purchased by the government from private 
firms, such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. Winston (1998) provides empirical examples of how the 
transfer of ownership from the government to private actors positively affects the creation and adoption of new 
technologies.   40
not contribute through ownership control and contestability, and industrialist competencies 
are hard to acquire and utilize. The competencies of inventors and skilled workers tend to be 
badly compensated. In addition, there will be a lack of competent customers and they will 
have difficulties in affecting production. As a result, the appropriate competence blocs will 
not emerge, and there will be no HGFs.  
Where the market mechanism cannot be relied on to ensure efficiency other devices can 
sometimes be used as substitutes (Hirschman 1970). In some cases, customers can “vote with 
their feet”, leaving particularly poorly run local governments in favor of better ones. In other 
cases, customers may express their wishes directly through complaints or active participation 
in the provision of the service (such as through the Parent-Teacher Association, PTA).  
Government-run organizations can to a varying degree use wages, promotion and other 
incentive mechanisms to improve efficiency. In some situations, a publicly run activity may 
even have some advantages over private alternatives, for example, if monitoring costs are 
high and the private firm has incentives to shirk on quality (Shleifer 1998). These alternative 
mechanisms can mitigate the problems associated with the removal of market forces, but are 
unlikely to fully offset the costs, especially since the market can be combined with alternative 
ways of influencing producers (see, e.g., Le Grand 2007).  
Public monopolies concentrate control over the functions of the competence bloc in the 
hands of politicians. This will have an adverse effect on competence blocs for several addi-
tional reasons. First, the recruitment of individuals to the different functions in the compe-
tence bloc is restricted to a narrow group of people. In order to achieve the best results the 
broadest pool of individuals possible should be considered when selecting individuals to the 
functions in the bloc. The possibility to reach critical mass in the competence bloc increases 
with the number of actors as does the probability that the most competent individuals carry 
out the respective functions.  
Second, politicians are not selected via the market process, i.e., accordingly to how well 
they manage the respective functions in the competence bloc. Instead they are selected 
through a political process, i.e., according to how well they attract voters. The two competen-
cies need not be correlated. Success in the political process generally requires a different set 
of competencies and experience compared to what is rewarded in economic markets (see, e.g., 
Pelikan 1993).  
Political competence may be a poor substitute for entrepreneurial, industrial, venture capi-
tal and secondary market actor competencies, since the essence of these functions is to gener-
ate profit through the commercialization of novel and commercially viable ideas in competi-  41
tive markets. In this context, private firms can be seen as “universities” for educating talented 
people, when entrepreneurial, industrial and venture capital competence is largely acquired 
through individual learning-by-doing in profit-driven firms. (cf. Eliasson and Vikersjö 
1999).
63  
Soft budget constraints (Kornai 1986) stand in the way of the politician’s function as a 
substitute for venture capitalists. In a well-functioning market economy incompetent venture 
capitalists will soon be outcompeted, and the misallocation of resources will be relatively 
small.
64 
In many well-developed countries efficient organizations cannot expand geographically, 
since local governments are responsible for production and are not allowed to expand outside 
their own region. Often consumers (e.g., patients) in the region are legally restricted to using 
the local provider. Such a policy de facto creates small regional production monopolies con-
trolled by local government and where consumers are geographically locked-in.  
The problems associated with product regulations are strengthened by prohibition or limi-
tations imposed on international trade. This makes it impossible to interact with international 
competence blocs; it is not possible to exploit economies of scale, utilize international specia-
lization and take advantage of the diffusion of knowledge, learning effects and knowledge 
spillovers that arise from export and import (see, e.g., Keller 2004, and Bernard et al. 2007).  
Government controlled organizations are governed by other criteria than economic effi-
ciency. Political considerations may reduce the scope for correcting mistakes, for example by 
downsizing or exit. Cutbacks become particularly difficult if the production unit is a large 
employer in a sparsely populated area. Furthermore, decision-making is bureaucratic in organ-
izations controlled by politicians and bureaucrats, and such organizations tend to lack flexibil-
ity (cf. Wilson 1989, and Wintrobe 1997). Finally, political control and the power of the polit-
ical system to define property rights and redistribute private property give rise to a negative 
incentive structure impinging on productive entrepreneurship and promoting socially harmful 
rent-seeking behavior (Bhagwati 1982, and Baumol 1990).  
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and develop entrepreneurial, industrial and venture capital competencies. Mistakes are less costly and learning 
costs lower in small firms because small values are at stake (Lucas 1978).  
64 See Duggan (2000) for a recent study of the importance of soft budget constraints for the performance of hos-
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7.4 Summary of the Effects of Product Market Regulations 
We have discussed three general cases affecting the creation and functioning of competence 
blocs and the potential for developing HGFs: (i) Production is contestable, but only govern-
ment financing of purchases is allowed; (ii) production is monopolized by government, but 
private financing is allowed; and (iii) production is monopolized and financed by government. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the analysis. The benchmark case is private production and 
private financing, as described in section 2.  
 
Table 5  Product Market Regulations and the Prevalence of Competence Blocs and HGFs.  
  Private production   Monopolized production 
Private financing  Entrepreneurs – Yes  
Inventors – Yes 
Industrialists – Yes 
Skilled labor – Yes 
Venture capitalists – Yes 
Actors in secondary markets – Yes 
Competent customers – Yes 
 
Complete competence blocs and preva-
lence of HGFs 
Entrepreneurs – No 
Inventors– Limited 
Industrialists – No 
Skilled labor – Limited 
Venture capitalists – No 
Actors in secondary markets – No 
Competent customers – Limited 
 
No competence blocs and no HGFs, 
imperfectly replaced by government 
Public 
Financing 
Entrepreneurs – Possible 
Inventors – Possible 
Industrialists – Possible 
Skilled labor – Yes 
Venture capitalists – Possible 
Actors in secondary markets – Possible 
Competent customers – Limited 
 
Potential impediments to competence 
blocs and to HGFs, depending on institu-
tional climate  
Entrepreneurs – No  
Inventors–Limited 
Industrialists– No 
Skilled labor – Limited 
Venture capitalists – No 
Actors in secondary markets – No 
Competent customers – No 
 
No competence blocs and no HGFs, 
imperfectly substituted by government
 
According to our analysis, governmental monopolization of production has a highly detrimen-
tal effect on competence blocs and HGFs, which fail to evolve because critical entrepreneurial 
and venture capitalist competencies cannot be acquired through learning in competitive mar-
kets. The same is true in the case when government monopolizes production and the govern-
ment is also a monopsonist. If private production is allowed but financing is restricted to gov-
ernment only purchases of goods and services, the emergence of complete competence blocs 
will be hampered and HGFs are less likely to emerge. The analysis reveals that thriving com-
petence blocs and HGFs require free private provision of goods and services and private fi-
nancing. Only then can the incentives be harmonized for all actors in the competence bloc, 
thereby providing favorable circumstances for HGFs.    43
Hence, due to the de facto monopolization by the public sector of the production of many 
income-elastic services vast areas of the economy have remained unexploited as sources of 
commercial growth. Part of this problem is overcome if the public sector encourages com-
mercial firms to substitute for tax-financed public sector service production, even if the ser-
vice is provided free (or almost free) of charge to customers. A further step would be to allow 
service producers to offer additional services beyond what is granted through a tax-financed 
voucher system. This would provide stronger incentives for the actors in the competence bloc 
to launch HGFs. In particular, it is easy to imagine how a different organization of the health-
care sector could provide a basis for the emergence of new HGFs.  
Continued, near-exclusive reliance on taxation for the financing of key services like edu-
cation, health care, child care and care of the elderly will become increasingly problematic. 
These highly income-elastic services suffer from Baumol’s Disease (Baumol 1993, and Jans-
son 2006). Further technological breakthroughs are likely to increase the supply of services in 
the health sector in the future. If private purchasing power is not allowed into these sectors, 
they become tax-financed “cost problems” rather than potential growth industries attracting 
talented entrepreneurs and other key actors in the competence bloc.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The successful commercialization of an innovation requires competence blocs: An entire 
chain of actors with complementary competencies that work together. The high degree of 
complexity in production combined with the specificity of human capital makes successful 
interaction within the competence bloc difficult but also highly rewarding when successful. 
Most (potential) HGFs fail, but the few that succeed stand for a substantial part of growth and 
development.  
Bringing together the specialized, non-transferable competencies of different actors into a 
well-functioning whole is invariably difficult, even with favorable institutions and public pol-
icies, and almost impossible in any other setting. Favorable economic institutions are likely to 
be of particular importance for the emergence of HGFs, both because of the sensitiveness of 
competencies to good institutions and because of the high social return in terms of growth and 
job creation.  
Our meta-analysis suggests that a small group of high-growth firms, not necessarily small 
but relatively young, are of critical importance as a force for renewal in the economy. Empiri-
cal investigations show that these HGFs, also known as “Gazelles”, are responsible for the 
bulk of net job creation. Since formal institutions are important for economic performance in   44
general, it is fair to hypothesize that they also influence the generation and growth of HGFs. It 
is also reasonable to believe that institutions have a differential effect on HGFs compared to 
the majority of firms with no growth ambitions. For instance, the availability of equity capital 
and the strictness of employment security mandates are critical for enterprises with high 
growth ambitions, while they are of much less importance for firms without growth potential 
or growth ambitions.  
Analyzing HGFs using the theory of competence blocs offers a more holistic view on 
economic progress. A key insight is that rapid firm growth is a complex process requiring a 
number of different but complementary competencies, and it is clear that studies with a nar-
row focus on a single aspect are likely to be misleading. Our analysis also emphasizes the 
complementary character of institutions.
65 There is no “quick-fix” that will boost the frequen-
cy of HGFs. Lower taxes on entrepreneurial activities may have less effect than expected if 
high taxes on skilled labor give rise to bottlenecks in production or if key areas remain closed 
for entrepreneurial exploitation. If policymakers would like to improve conditions for HGFs, 
our analysis suggests that they need to adopt a broad approach and implement a wide array of 
complementary institutional reforms.  
We wish to emphasize that it is incorrect to infer that organic growth should be promoted 
and acquired growth avoided, based on studies showing that organic growth contributes more 
to net employment growth. Acquired growth is an important mechanism for reallocating em-
ployment and other resources from less to more efficient organizations. In fact, it is a natural 
pattern when an industry matures that the number of firms is rapidly reduced through a selec-
tion process.  
Creating appropriate conditions for growth based on effective competence blocs places 
great demands on government policies. In particular, such growth requires appropriate legal 
structures (including further deregulation of product markets) that encourage the spontaneous 
emergence of effective solutions from the bottom up. As is pointed out by many research 
scholars, picking winners in this chaotic world is virtually impossible and the only winning 
strategy is “to let a thousand flowers bloom” (see, e.g., Birch 2006, pp. 198–199). It is the 
perpetual search by economic actors for profits that exceed the risk-adjusted rate of return 
available for passive investors that leads to a situation in which entrepreneurship, talent and 
ownership skills are channeled to the most promising areas and supplied in the best possible 
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provides an interesting parallel. They show how the effectiveness of one policy depends on the implementation 
of other policies.   45
quantities. This increases the probability that new business opportunities will be developed 
and exploited to their potential. This process creates the organizational and structural capital 
that is an indispensable component in all successful enterprises. The potential entrepreneur 
can always refrain from using his/her skills and remain an employee with a fixed salary; the 
venture capitalist can choose to remain passive instead of supplementing his/her financial 
investment by supplying management skills and so on.  
Our analysis is confined to highly developed countries with basic institutions, such as se-
cure property rights and the rule of law, in place. By applying the theory of competence blocs 
we have identified three bundles of institutions which are likely to be particularly important 
for the generation and growth of HGFs: The tax system, the organization and regulation of 
labor markets and product market regulations. To summarize the effects of these institutions 
on HGFs we characterize institutions that provide a favorable environment for “dynamic capi-
talism”, the experimental process of creative destruction nurturing competence blocs and 
HGFs, as well as institutions that do the reverse, instead promoting “sclerotic capitalism”; see 
table 6. Note that the introduction of a single measure disfavoring dynamic capitalism may 
have only minor sclerotic effects, and the introduction of a certain sclerotic institution may be 
offset by other dynamic institutions. Strong effects pushing the system in either a sclerotic or 
dynamic direction are likely to result from the reinforcing complementarity of numerous insti-
tutions.  
Of the three categories of institutions we have discussed, monopolization of production 
poses the greatest obstacle for the creation and functioning of competence blocs and genera-
tion of HGFs. While high taxes and labor market regulations also impinge on the creation and 
functioning of competence blocs, there is often some scope for (costly) tax evasion and cir-
cumvention of labor market regulations. Moreover, the more complicated and the less stable 
regulations, the more they benefit large incumbent firms, i.e., firms with a low probability of 
becoming HGFs. Generally, we find distortions introduced by the three bundles of institutions 
analyzed to disfavor the kind of firms that have been found to be overrepresented among 
HGFs, namely young, small and service sector firms. 
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Table 6 Institutions  Favoring  Sclerotic  Capitalism and Dynamic Capitalism. 
Institution  Sclerotic capitalism  Dynamic capitalism 
Marginal tax rate  High  Low 
Personal tax on capital income  High  Low 
Personal tax on capital gains  High  Low 
Tax on stock options  High  Low 
Degree of tax neutrality across 
owner categories 
Favor institutional own-
ers over individuals 
Neutrality 
Degree of neutrality across 
sources of finance 
Favor debt over equity  Neutrality 
Personal taxation of asset hold-
ings 
Yes, in particular on eq-
uity 
No, or exemption for 
equity holdings 
Corporate tax rate  High statutory rate, low 
effective rate and exemp-
tions favoring large firms 
in mature industries  
Low statutory rate, low 
effective rate and neutral 
a cross types of firms and 
industries 
Symmetric tax treatment of 
profit and losses 
No Yes 
Labor security mandates   Tied to years of tenure  Portability of tenure 
rights 
Design of pension plans   Large weight to best 
years at high age 
Fully actuarial 
Wage-setting arrangements  Centralized and closely 
tied to formal criteria 
Decentralized and indivi-
dualized 
Production of welfare servic-
es/merit goods 
Government production  Sizeable private produc-
tion, contestability 
Financing of welfare servic-
es/merit goods 
Tax financing only  Government ensures ba-
sic high quality supply, 
then private financing 
Profit-driven organizations   Partly de facto prohibited 
in key areas facing in-
come-elastic demand 
Fully allowed 
Government role in income in-
surance 




Government monopolization of production considerably constrains the evolution of contesta-
ble markets, where critical entrepreneurial and venture capitalist competencies can be devel-
oped and acquired through learning. De facto prohibition of profit-driven organizations have 
the same effect. Consequently, there will be no competence blocs and no HGFs. Large service 
industries are still de facto monopolized in many OECD-countries. Prime examples include 
higher education, providing a large economic potential for deregulation and contestability.  
Even in advanced economies, there is a large untapped economic potential which can be 
unleashed by institutional changes, such as the opening up of closed markets for entrepre-  47
neurial competition. This would be expected to have a positive effect on the emergence of 
competence blocs and the prevalence of HGFs. The effect would be more pronounced if tax 
structures and labor market institutions simultaneously were adjusted in order to stimulate the 
emergence of more effective competence blocs, and institutions were made more neutral with 
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